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The rich nation is the novelty, and the development 
that makes entire nations rich is itself the pivotal 
development of modern history 
(Asa Briggs, British historian, 1963) 
 
Abstract 
Seen in historical perspective the main economic predicaments of the present world (such 
as poverty, inequality, backwardness) appear in a somewhat different light than in many 
current discussions, especially by sociologists, radical economists and political scientists. In 
the present paper the achievements of the modern age, and in particular of the post- World 
War II period, are considered in the perspective of economic and demographic history, and 
in their connection with the contemporary systems of production and of international 
relations. Some considerations concerning future possible developments conclude the 
paper.  
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1. Introduction and outline 
We live in a very unequal world plagued by poverty. Overall, economic progress is 
perceived as too slow, as the advance of “globalization” renders the inequalities and 
miseries of the world less tolerable than in the past. There is a widespread rejection in some 
quarters (radical economists and political scientists in particular) of the economic 
institutions of the modern world (identified under the garb of “capitalism” and 
“globalization”).1  However, from the perspective of economic history the present state of 
the world appears in a different light. A rather uncontroversial fact is that never in the 
history of mankind have there been so many paupers as in the present times. But the basic 
reason for this is that never have there been so many people around. Indeed, never in the 
history of the world has the percentage of (absolutely) poor people been so low. Moreover, 
quite recently even the absolute number of very poor has kept decreasing. The 
preoccupation with overcoming backwardness and poverty, helping the poor of the world 
to reach better living standards, has been translated into development assistance and in the 
search for the best way to help countries to develop. But the results of development 
assistance have been by and large disappointing. Contrary to the liberal enlightened 
perspective, no easy recipe for the problem of backwardness, and for the specific one of 
the fragile states, is in sight. But, if we are looking to the post-war experience, it is fair to 
say that the continuation and intensification of the globalization process could certainly 
help. Economic inequality in the world as a whole has probably never been so high, but the 
reason is not, as sometimes hinted, that the lot of the poorer has worsened 
(“exploitation”), but the dramatic, albeit unequally distributed, economic betterment of the 
many. At the same time the propensity towards economic inequality (as captured by the 
extraction ratio, defined below) has probably never been so low in historical times. The 
green revolution and technological progress have contributed to decisively overcome the 
Malthusian trap, and to bring about an impressive demographic explosion. Indeed, never in 
the history of the world has economic and demographic growth been so rapid as after 
WWII, greatly favoured by the absence of major wars, 2 of the sort that were endemic in 
the past, and by the extraordinary expansion of international exchange. Global overall 
peace can be obviously attributed to the mutual threat of atomic destruction, but also to a 
change of perspective in international relations against the respectability of wars of 
aggression and conquest, leading to a change in the rules of the game, which was already 
attempted, but utterly failed, after the first World War. The price to pay has been the 
lingering of the world on the brink of a global nuclear catastrophe, as well as the freezing 
of frontiers and national aspirations (which have surged again with a vengeance after the 
end of the Cold War). But Malthusian traps, and different forces threatening the 
destabilization of relatively peaceful world coexistence (such as the inevitable diffusion of 
nuclear capabilities and the rise of nationalism in some quarters) are looming, with the 
                                                 
1  For a sympathetic survey of those opinions see Zolo (2007). For a confutation of all sort of widespread 
anti-globalization prejudices and conventional opinions see Bhagwati, 2007. For a forceful defence of 
capitalist globalization see Norberg (2003). 
2  This means all-out wars between major military powers. Of course there was no want of “minor” conflicts 
(for a list of them and an estimate of their presumed victims see Balint, 1996), but for relative intensity and 
proportion of victims in the global world population they were apparently of much lesser importance than 
in other epochs. 
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potentiality of drawing the post-war period of overall peaceful economic and demographic 
growth eventually to a close. 
2. Poverty 
Historically world population has been increasing at a very slow pace, amounting to 
near stagnation, held in check by high mortality rates, especially of child mortality. Per 
capita incomes have been mostly at what we would regard utter poverty levels, and 
whenever they have increased they have done so at a very slow pace, amounting, in the 
very long run, to some small fraction of one percent yearly. Following the industrial 
revolution things have started radically to change. But never have world population and 
world income increased so tumultuously as after the Second World War; indeed, the 
explosion both in wealth and population in this post-war period has been an historical 
unicum. Scientifically speaking, from the perspective of the history of mankind the 
anomaly to be explained is not backwardness and poverty, but development and wealth. 
The brakes that in the previous epochs constrained the growth of world population, and 
which started to slacken following the Industrial Revolution,3 have apparently been swept 
away by the progressive lengthening in life expectancy, leading to unprecedented 
demographic growth, which has been accompanied by unprecedented economic growth. 
Still, a large part of humanity lives in appalling poverty conditions. Indeed, there 
has never been such a high number of poor people in the world as in the post WWII 
period. If conventionally (very conventionally, indeed) we define, following the World 
Bank, as (absolute) poverty a daily consumption of less that two dollars,4 their number in 
2005 was estimated as 2.56 billion, more than the entire world population in 1950.5 The 
number of extreme poor consuming less than one dollar a day in 2005 is reckoned to have 
been higher than 1.1 billion, about the same as the entire world population in 1820 (which 
may be conventionally taken as the year of the coming of age of the Industrial Revolution 
in the UK and the start of its spreading abroad); the number of the extreme poor in 
previous years is estimated to have been even higher, about 1.9 billion around 1980 (before 
the recent tumultuous growth of the economy of China). Most of them are concentrated in 
third world countries, but a few millions are living in (and a number of them leaving from) 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the so called transition countries). 6 See the data in the 
tables 1 and 2:  
 
 
                                                 
3  Or more exactly, following the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that has led 
first to the Industrial Revolution and, subsequently, through the medical and public hygiene innovations it 
was able to conjure, to the Mortality Revolution of the second half of the nineteenth century and later, 
coinciding with the times of what has been dubbed the Second Industrial Revolution (cf. Easterlin, 1996, 
pp. 7-9, 23-29, 69 f.). 
4  In the text we use the colloquially usual distinction of 1 and 2 dollars a day. Recently the World Bank has 
updated its definitions following a revised and extended appraisal of PPP exchange rates. The data in the 
tables 1 and 2 are according to the new definition. We shall deal with these issues in the next section. 
5  See table 1. We refer to the World Bank data as the most authoritative, even by no means uncontroversial, 
source. The accuracy of World Bank data has been challenged in particular by Bhalla (2002) who estimates a 
significantly lower number of absolute poor and a much faster decrease in poverty in the two decades of 
accelerated globalization, between 1980 and 2000.  
6  The data in the fourth row  of the two tables below refer to Europe and Central Asia, but the poor in the 
area are essentially concentrated in the transition countries of Eastern Europe (including South-Eastern 
Europe) and of the former Soviet Union. 
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Table 1. Number of people living with less than 2$ a day (millions)  
Region 1981 2005 
East Asia & Pacific 1,278 728 
of which China 972 473 
Europe & Central Asiaa 35 41 
Latin America & Caribbean  89 94 
\Middle East & North Africa 46 51 
South Asia 799 1,09 
Sub-Saharan Africa 291 555 
Total 2538 2560 
Excluding China 1,566 2,142 
Source: Word Bank (2009), table 2.8, P.70.  
a66 in 1999. 
 
Table 2. Number of people living with less than 1.25$ a day (millions) 
Region 1981 2005 
East Asia & Pacific 1072 316 
 China 835 208 
Europe & Central Asiaa 7 17 
Latin America & Caribbean 47 45 
Middle East & North Africa 14 11 
South Asia 548 596 
Sub-Saharan Africa 211 388 
Total 1,898 1,373 
Excluding China 1063 877 
Source: as in the table 1.  
a24 in 1999 
 
2.1 Poverty and transition  
It is notable that the number of the poor in transition countries as a whole has 
reached a peak in 1999, just a visible sign of the hardship engendered by the transition 
process during the nineties, but since then it has started to decrease. The same applies to 
the percentage of the poor in the population.7 The dynamics of the poverty rates is just a 
manifestation of the overall costs of transition, as borne out by the dynamics of national 
income and, in the case of the former USSR, of vital statistics (see tables 5, 7 and 9 below). 
The psychological hardship of the new poor in transition countries could have been made 
worse “by the drop from earlier achieved levels and expectations, and the loss of security” 
(Nuti, 2009). But in comparison to the countries where poverty was more permanent and 
more widespread the new poor in transition countries could benefit of the household 
goods accumulated in the past and of a better chance to be helped by better off friends and 
relatives. 
                                                 
7  Cf. World Bank (2009), p. 70.. 
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2.2 The world poor as a percentage 
But on the whole the share of the poor in the human population has never been so 
low. According to the historical estimates reported in Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, 
pp. 731-732), and taking into account the number of conventional poor people in 2005, 
estimated by the World Bank (2009), as well as the estimate of the size of world population 
in 2005, reported in table 3, the share of world population living in poverty diminishes 
from 94,4% in 1820 to 39% in 2005, that of those living in extreme poverty from 83,9 in 
1820 down to 21% in 2005. In the end, taking into account the fact that in the period the 
share of the poor has greatly diminished, the fundamental explanation of why there are so 
many poor people in the world is that there are so many people around. Indeed, human 
population has increased steadily and dramatically in the last two centuries, and in 
particular in the last few decades. Some relevant data are reported in table 3. 8 
Table 3 Human population in the course of history (in millions) 
8000 BC 5  
1000 BC 50  
500 BC 100  
1 AD 231  
1000  268  
1500 438  
1600 556  
1700 603  
1750  790  
1800 980  
1820 1,041 
1870 1,271 
1913 1,791  
1950 2,535  
1960 3,032  
1970 3,699  
1980 4,451  
1990 5,295 
1995 5,719  
2001 6,148 
2005 6, 515  
2010 
6,815, April 2010, as projected according to 
the World population clock 
The sources of the data are as follows: 8000 BC, Haub, 1995, p. 5, quoted in US Census Bureau 
(2007a); 1000 and 500 BC, McEvedy and Jones, 1978, pp. 342-351, quoted in US Census Bureau 
(2007a); 1-1700 and 1820-1913, Maddison (2006), p. 636; 1750 and 1800, United Nations, 1999; 1950-
2005, United Nations, 2008, with the exception of 2001, taken from US Census Bureau 2007b.  
 
                                                 
8  The data from 1800 in Europe, and from 1900 in the other continents are regarded, by and large, to have a 
fair degree of reliability. The data concerning the previous years are just estimates or, even, more or less, 
wild guesses. They should be considered to give an order of magnitude, rather than provide reliable data 
with any degree of precision (on this see Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2002). Indeed, this applies even more 
to the estimates concerning national income in the tables that follow. 
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To grasp the extent of the dramatic acceleration of population growth in recent 
times one may notice that the increase in population in the ten years between 1995 and 
2005 (796 million) is more or less the same as that in the 10,000 years or so from the start 
of the agricultural revolution till the dawn of the industrial revolution (for which we may 
conventionally take the year 1750). Looking at the first lines of the table, comparing them 
with the last ones, one is forced to come to terms with the fact that the momentous 
historical events of our distant past, recollected and magnified in history books, involved 
such comparatively insignificant numbers of people. 
2.3 The evaluation of poverty 
Of course this depends crucially on the definition of the poor. Here we use the 
World Bank definition, whereby the poor are defined in terms of absolute purchasing 
power, establishing “a realistic lower bound for the minimum … level of consumption to 
meet basic human needs” (World Bank, 2008, p. 2). This may not well correspond to a 
subjective, socially and environmentally conditioned, definition of poverty, in the sense of 
deprivation (see on this point, in particular, Kenny, 2006). 9 Subjective deprivation may be 
a function of achieved living standards, and increasing expectations, while relative poverty 
depends on distribution. Subjective poverty depends on habits and aspirations, where the 
latter increase with the diffusion, facilitated by the means of mass communication, of the 
consumption models of the better off. Notwithstanding all these complex qualitative 
aspects of poverty, without a common quantitative measure one could hardly make 
intertemporal comparisons. Of course, in making them one should ideally go into detail as 
to the specific relevant circumstances of the various cases (possibly extending the narrative 
to the whole range of Sen’s capabilities). Here we may be content to note that the trends in 
average incomes are corroborated by comparable trends in vital statistics such as in 
particular life expectancy (see tables 7 and 9 below), which refer to qualitative important 
aspects of living standards. 
How are the poverty benchmarks of the World Bank at 1$ a day and 2$ a day 
determined? Basically the first refers to the average national poverty level of a set of the 
poorest countries of the world, and the second to the average national poverty level of the 
developing countries as a whole. Recently the World Bank has revalued the dimension of 
world poverty, following a new expanded data base of household income and expenditure 
surveys, and a new comprehensive assessment of PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) exchange 
rates. In particular the internal price level in a number of poor countries has turned out to 
be higher than previously understood, and thus the purchasing power of international 
dollars lower. A reason advanced is that the lower quality of goods consumed by the poor 
in poorer countries was not sufficiently accounted for.10 A new extreme poverty 
benchmark level has been set at 1.25 US$ at 2005 purchasing power, and the new poverty 
level at 2 US$ of 2005 international purchasing power. According to the new criteria 
extreme poverty is more widespread than according to the old. However the dynamic 
                                                 
9  Kenny emphasizes the negative impact of increasing expectations and new consumer goods on welfare or 
happiness. But happiness is a rather subjective matter, well expressed by the Italian poet Metastasio: “Se a 
ciascun l'interno affanno si leggesse in fronte scritto, quanti mai, che invidia fanno, ci farebbero pietà!” (“If 
everybody’ s internal pain were written on their forehead, many who are envied now, would be pitied 
instead.”) As economists, we may content ourselves of dealing with per capita incomes, but with many 
caveats, among others of the kind argued by Kenny. On happiness and economic growth see also Easterlin, 
1996, pp. 131-144. 
10  Cf. World Bank, 2008, pp. 3,8. 
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aspect of world poverty has remained qualitatively the same, since even with the new 
estimates “over 15 years global poverty fell by an average of 1 percentage point a year” 
(World Bank, 2008, p.1). “Global poverty measured at the $1.25 a day line has been 
decreasing since the 1980s. The number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 1.9 
billion in 1981 to 1.8 billion in 1990 to about 1.4 billion in 2005” (ibidem, p. 10). The criteria 
used for defining extreme poverty according to the new benchmarks are still the same as 
before—“the poverty line typical of the poorest countries of the world” establishing “a 
realistic lower bound for the minimum… level of consumption to meet basic human 
needs” (ibidem, pp. 1-2). In particular, “the new extreme poverty line is set at $1.25 a day in 
2005 PPP terms, which represents the mean of the poverty lines found in the poorest 15 
countries ranked by per capita consumption” (ibidem, p. 22). In turn $2 a day in 2005 PPP 
terms represents the median poverty line for the developing countries of the world (ibidem, 
p. 10).  
3. An unequal world 
While a considerable share of world population still lives in poverty, world income 
and wealth are very unequally distributed. A recent research by Wider, the ONU economic 
research centre on poverty and development11 (Davis et alii, 2006a), shows the extent of 
world inequality in the distribution of personal wealth: 12  
The 24 richer OECD countries own 83% of world private wealth (64% at PPP$) 
with only 15% of world population and a per capita wealth of $116,000 (114,000 at PPP$). 
The 64 poorest countries with 40% of world population own 2% of world personal wealth 
(8% at PPP$), with a per capita wealth of 1000$ (5000 at PPP$)13 In 2000 the 1% richest 
adults owned the 40% of overall private wealth (32% in  PPP$ terms)14; the richest 10%, 
85%; the poorest 50%, 1% (4% in PPP$ terms).15 The Gini index of inequality of overall 
world wealth distribution (calculated using current exchange rates) is given as 89 (80 in 
                                                 
11  World Institute for Development Economics Research: http://www.wider.unu.edu. 
12  Where personal wealth is defined as “the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities” (Davies et alii, 
2006a, p. 1). The data refer to the year 2000. Methodology: “average wealth level: based on household 
balance sheets and wealth survey data for 38 countries (56% of the world population and 80% of wealth) 
extended by regression methods to most other countries region--income class averages imputed to 
remaining countries…distribution of wealth: based on distribution data for 20 countries wealth 
concentration estimated from income distribution for most other countries region--income class averages 
imputed to remaining countries” (Davies et alii, 2006b). The data refer to the year 2000, and are either 
measured in dollar terms at the current exchange rates or in Purchasing Power Parity dollars (PPP$; this 
means that all values are converted in dollars using exchange rates so determined that the purchasing power 
of the dollar will be more or less the same once transformed in the various world currencies). It must be 
noted that passing from current dollars to PPP$ reduces somewhat world inequality, since the dollar 
purchasing power is usually higher in poorer countries, but it does not alter substantially the global picture. 
It should also be noted that an inquiry such as the one referred to above is based on limited data and 
fraught with methodological difficulties; it must be therefore stressed that, as always is the case with 
statistics, but even more in the present instance, the data should be considered to give some order of 
magnitude rather than to be taken at face value. For a detailed explanation of the methods used in the 
inquiry one may refer to the above source. 
13  Ibidem, Table 8. 
14  “37% reside in the US, 27% in Japan” (Davies et alii, 2006b). 
15  Davies et alii, 2006a, Table 10, and Table 11a. 
 10 
PPP$ terms)16, the same as that of a group of 10, where a single person has 1000, and the 
remaining nine 1 each.17 
Income is distributed less unequally than wealth, but still in a markedly unequal 
way. According to most estimates, reported in Milanovic (2006, p. 8), the Gini coefficient 
of world income distribution is around 65% in the contemporary world.18 To make a 
comparison, the Gini index of the distribution of family incomes of Italy is reported (in 
CIA, 2009) as 32, of the USA 45, of Sweden 23. The state where the Gini index appears to 
be highest is Namibia with 71, but perhaps only because in other, even more unequal less 
developed countries endowed with plenty or natural resources no statistical data allowing 
its calculation are available. 19 
 
Table 4. Poverty and income distribution in recent world history 
year Gini coefficient of world 
income distribution 
Percentage of the 
population living in 
Poverty 
Percentage of the 
population living in 
extreme poverty 
1820 0.500 94.4 83.9 
1850 0.532 92.5 81.5 
1870 0.560 89.6 75.4 
1890 0.588 85.7 71.7 
1910 0.610 82.4 65.6 
1929 0.616 75.9 56.3 
1950 0.640 71.9 54.8 
1960 0.635 64.3 44 
1970 0.650 60.1 35.6 
1980 0.657 55 31.5 
1992 0.657 51.3 23.7 
2001 0.657 (0.699)a 44 18 
Data taken from Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731); the percentages of the two right cells of the last row are 
calculated from population data in table 3 and Word Bank poverty data according to the older 1$ - 2$ methodology 
(which is used by Bourguignon and Morrison). aCalculation from 2002 World Income Distribution Database in Milanovic 
(28/12/2007); the figure between brackets is calculated using the recently revised set of PPP$ exchange rates.  
3.1 Inequality between nations and inequality inside nations 
Looking back at history it appears that in the past (before the “great divergence”20) 
income differences inside nations were relatively more relevant than nowadays in the 
determination of global inequality. In the pre-industrial world more than half of global 
income inequality could have been due to inequality in income distribution inside nations, 
while today the prevailing component, about 70%, is deemed to be due to differences in 
average per-capita incomes between nations (Milanovic, 2006, p. 9). On the other hand in 
more recent times the weight of the inside nations component seems to have somewhat 
                                                 
16  Ibidem, Table 12.. 
17  Davies et alii, 2006b, p. 9. 
18  The paper by Milanovic contains an interesting critical review of the different methodological approaches 
used to get those values. 
19 Such as Equatorial Guinea that has a per capita income higher than  Germany or the UK (CIA 2010), but 
where the great bulk of the population allegedly lives in desperate conditions (cf. “Playboy waits for his 
African throne “, Sunday Times, 3/9/2006, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article626511.ece). 
20  Cf. Pomeranz, 2000. 
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increased, but the trend is not uniform in the different regions of the world.21 The greater 
growth rate of less developed countries as a whole should be a factor leading to the 
reduction of the between nations component, while increased inequality inside developed 
countries is a factor contributing to the increased inside world inequality component. 
According to the data reported in Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731) there has been 
an increase through time in the world Gini coefficient, from 50 in 1820 up to the present 
values (see table 4). Values for so far away periods seem to be rather speculative estimates, 
even more daring than the speculative estimates needed to arrive at an aggregate measure 
for the contemporary world as a whole.22 But it seems plausible that income inequality 
should have been lower in the past, owing to the fact that the great bulk of the population 
was living close to subsistence level, and given the low overall average per capita incomes. 
In a quite recent paper Milanovic (2009) revises the estimates of Burguignon and Morrison, 
arriving at some interesting quantitative conclusions: The global Gini coefficient for 1820 is 
reduced to 43. The Gini coefficient measuring inequality between nations (where individual 
incomes inside any given nation are taken as equal to the average value) raises from 15 to 
32 between 1820 and 1870, increasing up to 55-60 in the after WWII period, showing some 
reduction in the last twenty years due to the economic progress of China and India, in 
particular. Between 1820 and the present times, the between countries component of the 
global world inequality index raises from 35 to 80-85 percent.  
 
4. What is the source of the present high inequalities and what can we 
do about it 
4.1 Poverty, inequality, maximum potential inequality, and the extraction rate 
According to table 4, while world inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, 
has steadily increased since 1820 (an increase of the coefficient between 31% and 40%, 
according to the two different estimates of the 2001 value), the proportion of paupers in 
the world has steadily decreased. 
Under primitive conditions, when per capita incomes are close to the subsistence 
level, the amount of surplus the economy can produce above physical subsistence is 
limited. This limits the percentage of national income that can be appropriated by the elite, 
and thus the maximum level of the inequality measure (such as the Gini coefficient or the 
Theil index) that can be possibly achieved, assuming an elite dimensionally nought in 
relation to the whole population (see fig. 1). As per capita levels increase, this leads to an 
increase in the percentage of the national income that could be accounted for as surplus 
above subsistence, and to an increase in the maximum achievable inequality, as measured, 
say, by the maximum Gini coefficient compatible with the maintenance of the mass of the 
                                                 
21  Cf. Nel, 2006, p. 697I; IMF, 2007a, pp. 138 f. 
22  And indeed the methodological approach of the two authors appears to be particularly rough. See on this 
regard Milanovic, 2009, pp. 2-3; Baten et alii, 2009. On the other hand the results of the latter study, 
pursued through an alternative, but also rough, methodological approach confirm on the whole 
Bourguignon and Morrison’s results. 
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population at the physical subsistence level,23 and thus with the minimal condition ensuring 
persistence in its actual dimensions of the given society over time.24 Thus we may consider 
Fig. 1 The maximum possible Gini coefficient as a function of average income 
 
as a true measure of the extent of inequality achieved by a given society not the inequality 
index (such as the Gini coefficient) per se, but the percentage achieved of the maximum 
inequality index associated with a given per capita income level. According to the definition 
in Milanovic (2009) and Milanovic et alii (2007), this is the inequality extraction ratio (from 
now on: ier). With the increase in world per capita income following the industrial 
revolution the maximum possible inequality index, which may be measured in terms of 
Gini coefficient or of Theil index, progressively increases. According to Milanovic (2009, p. 
18) the maximum possible world Gini coefficient increases from 56 in 1820 to 95 in 2005. 
                                                 
23  As Milanovic (2004, p. 24) puts it: “Average income levels also set an upper boundary on inequality. … As 
societies develop, income inequality has the ‘space’ to grow simply because there is a surplus which can be 
appropriated or redistributed among members of the society.” 
24  In a Malthusian perspective the population itself can be seen as a function of the part of income that is 
allocated in supplying subsistences. By given resources and technology, whenever decreasing returns set in 
there are two conflicting effects of population increase on the size of surplus: 1. by any given per capita 
surplus, more people bring in more total extractable surplus; 2. but more people decrease per capita surplus 
produced. If the relationship is perceived, it can affect, in theory at least, the extraction and population 
policy of the elite, since under pre-industrial circumstances more extraction can bring about a population 
reduction, less extraction an increase. It can be easily seen in this respect that in the long run the size of the 
population that allows the maximum surplus extraction is when the marginal productivity of labour is equal 
to the subsistence wage, while the maximum possible population is when there is no surplus and per capita 
income is equal to the subsistence wage. 
a
AB = (Y°-wsP°)/Y° 
BC= wsP°/Y° 
wsP/Y° 
P/P° (wsP/Y°)/(P/P°)=wsP°/Y° 
Gini coefficient a/(1/2)=2a. The greater the productivity of the economy, and thus the 
greater Y°,  the lower the line wsP/Y° and the greater the area a and thus the higher the 
Gini coefficient. 
P°= total population, made up by subsistence workers: the dimension of the elite is 
negligible; P/P°= P-workers’ population share; wS=subsistence wage;  
Y°=total income; Y/Y°=P-workers’ income share, where Y=wsP 
A 
B 
C 
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As we have seen from the Bourguignon-Morrison (henceforward BM) data the actual 
world Gini coefficient has increased, but at a lower rate. Taking the data of table 4 this 
means that the inequality extraction ratio decreases from 50/56=89% in 1820 to 
66/95=70% or 70/95=74% (in case of the higher Gini estimate) in 2005. However, 
Milanovic (2009) brings down the Gini coefficient in 1820 to the lower level of 43, and this 
leads to a much lower reduction in the extraction ratio between 1820 and 2005, from 
43/56=77% to 74 or 70%. In terms of the Theil index, however, the reduction in ier is 
much more relevant, halving from 70% in 1820 to 35% in 2005 (p. 18). Even the almost 
invariant Gini extraction rates however hide quite a deep change: while the inequality 
extraction rate inside nations has on average strongly decreased, the between nations 
component of inequality, and of the inequality extraction rate, had markedly increased. We 
may arrive therefore at the conclusion, on the basis of the degree of the decrease of 
inequality extraction rate inside nations, that on the whole the propensity to inequality has 
very much decreased, and that the responsibility for the increased world inequality between 
1820 and present times is entirely of the “great divergence”, the dramatic increase in the 
well being of the economically more advanced countries. The overall trend towards the 
decrease of inequality (and of the extraction ratio) inside nations could have been a 
consequence of the changed nature of political and economic institutions and of greater 
economic and social complexity, both causes and consequences of modern economic 
growth. To some extent the degree of inequality may be a consequence of the rules of 
economic organization (the economic system) that allow the attainment of the given 
production level (as argued, with some exaggeration, by Marx, 1875: “any distribution 
whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the 
conditions of production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the 
mode of production itself”). Thus it is conceivable that under real circumstances inequality 
could not be reduced below some level (such as measured by Gini coefficient) without 
bringing about a reduction of income produced, and of its growth.25 At the same time too 
much inequality can have a negative impact on income and growth.26 One could then 
modify the concept of extraction rate as referring to the additional inequality above the 
minimum level compatible with the attainment of the given per capita income.27 The 
extraction rate would than refer to the proportion of the difference between the two, 
concretely attained by an individual economy. At the same time it is conceivable that the 
degree of inequality compatible with the attainment of a certain level of per capita income 
could vary according to the specific  institutional characteristics of the economic system.  
                                                 
25  “An artificially compressed distribution of income differs from the optimal distribution based on 
differences in talent, merit, and effort, and for this reason inhibits growth by affecting incentives, labour 
shirking, and free-riding behaviour” (Cornia, 2004, p. 9), where the implied optimality presumably refers to 
the objective of fostering growth, and perhaps to some implied social welfare function. 
26  Cf. Milanovic et al. (2007, pp. 29-30): “More political power and patronage implies more inequality. The 
frequent claim that inequality promotes accumulation and growth does not get much support from history. 
On the contrary, great economic inequality has always been correlated with extreme concentration of 
political power, and that power has always been used to widen the income gaps through rent-seeking and 
rent-keeping, forces that demonstrably retard economic growth.” For the relationship of inequality and 
growth, and the hypothesis that it could be u-shaped (too little as well as too much inequality being 
adversary to growth) see Cornia et al. (2004). 
27 Operationally we could, for instance, take the minimum level of inequality in comparable economies having 
similar levels of per capita income as a lower bound to the minimum amount of inequality compatible with 
the sustainable production of the given per capita income., and as an upper bound the maximum level of 
inequality in comparable economies having similar levels of per capita income. 
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Obviously one thing is inequality of incomes, another inequality of welfare. The 
latter is a very elusive concept, but it is what really matters. The first is at best a proxy. In 
considering how does income inequality translate into inequality in welfare it seems 
reasonable to assume decreasing utility of income, appraised for instance through 
“extended sympathy” (putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes). As a consequence one 
can argue that the income inequalities of the present have lesser relevance than the 
inequalities of the past, since they could be associated with lower inequalities in terms of 
welfare. Another relevant consideration is that welfare (what is called welfare in common 
language) depends on a set of non-economic circumstances, such as degree of inequality in 
social dignity, degree of inequality in civil rights, feeling of personal security, envy or 
compassion, etc. Furthermore one should also consider the different subjective cost, or 
satisfaction, of productive activities (such as discussed in the edonic theory of wages), the 
value attributed to economic success, the life standards needed for some professionals to 
"function" as such, the structure of political power, the rule of law, and personal dangers as 
related to status.  But all these kinds of considerations, which are akin to those made before 
with regard to poverty in section 2.4 would lead us too astray and we shall be content to 
refer to the basic economic data, taking comfort from the fact that people vote on welfare 
with their feet, moving from countries where per capita incomes are lower towards 
countries where per capita incomes are higher. Thus it may be fair to assume that 
inequalities in income and inequalities in welfare go together. 
In the end, seen in an historical context, the extent of present economic inequality 
appears not to depend on the paupers of the world being worse off, since an increasing 
proportion of them are progressively lifted from a state of absolute abject poverty, but on 
the fact that on the whole the lot of humans has dramatically, albeit quite unequally, 
improved. 
We could then modify Milanovic’s concept of extraction rate as referring to the 
additional inequality above the minimum level compatible with the production of at least 
the given per capita income. How much inequality would be needed to bring about a given 
production level is not de facto determinable, as it may depend on an a number of different 
circumstances that differ from one country to another, from one period of time to another, 
such as technology, avaibility of human and social capital, tradition and mental structures, 
dimension of a country, social knowledge of possible organizational variants etc. In the end 
a discourse of this kind could become rather murky, as always is the case with 
counterfactuals. But it seems plausible that some inequality is needed, if only for incentive 
and allocative purposes, in order to achieve some given rate of production, even with the 
most egalitarian approach to social organization. The above notional modification to the 
concept of surplus extraction, even if not easily quantifiable, may strengthen the conclusion 
that overall the rate of surplus extraction could be markedly lower nowadays than in the 
past if one considers that part of the increased in inequality of present times, as measured 
by Gini coefficient, could be the inevitable by-product of a more complex system of 
production leading to much higher per capita incomes, while inequality in the past could 
have been to a greater extent the consequence of an intrinsically exploitative system of 
social relations.  
4.2 Demographic explosion, economic growth and medical progress 
As a consequence of the unprecedented economic progress and of the diffusion of 
medical and hygiene innovations from the West to the Rest of the world, the rate of 
growth of world population has never been so high as after WWII (see Table 6). Among 
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the regions of the world the highest demographic growth rate has been that of Africa, the 
poorest region with the least economic growth.28 From this it is immediately evident that 
the strongest factor explaining the demographic explosion is the diffusion of medical 
innovations rather than economic growth per se (which at some stage leads to reduction of 
natality).29 The population explosion, together with the composite ethnic structure of the 
artificial political divisions left over from colonial times, replicated in the post-colonial state 
boundaries,30 and the low educational attainments, contribute to explain the tensions and 
bloody conflicts that have engulfed that unfortunate continent.31 
4.3 What can be done 
As to the concretely implementable measures for bringing about a more equal 
distribution, and reducing poverty, without affecting the unique engine of growth and 
welfare that has been running in the last sixty years or so of world history, there is no much 
clarity of thought. As is often the case, what appears at first sight is not what really is, if one 
looks rationally at the implications.  
4.3.1 Globalization, poverty and distribution 
For instance the various proposals for limiting the extent of the liberalization of the 
world market, such as advocated by the various anti-WTO and trade-unions inspired 
movements, would probably hamper a main source of growth and economic improvement 
of the enterprising poor.32 Indeed, it appears that for reducing the plight of the poor more 
globalization is needed, not less.33 Globalization improves the welfare of the worst off 
                                                 
28  The extreme poverty rate of less than 1$ a day in Sub-Saharan Africa is reported as 41% in IMF, October 
2007b, p. 20. On the whole the post-independence economic performance of African countries (with some 
exceptions, notably Botswana) has been dismal: “on average, over the period 1960–2000 Africa’s 
population-weighted per capita annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was a mere 0.1%” (Collier, 
2007a, p. 16763). But African economic performance has much improved since the late nineties (cf. IMF, 
2007a pp. 9, f.; IMF, 2007b); in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, per capita growth was running, before the 
recent economic crisis, at about 3% a year, not a bad performance considering the very high population 
growth rate (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). 
29  The impact of economic growth on the Mortality Revolution, and hence on demographic growth (before 
fertility controls step in) is downplayed by Easterlin (1996, pp. 69-93). 
30  This does not mean that “natural” ethnical state boundaries would have existed anyway, given the 
patchwork distribution of ethnicities in the African continent. At any rate the complex ethnical structure of 
many African states appears to be an obstacle to development (cf. Easterly and Levine, 1997). The great 
success story in Africa, that of Botswana, may not be unrelated to the relatively great (for African standards) 
ethnic homogeneity of that country (ibidem, p. 1218). 
31  For a recent in-depth assessment of Africa’s economic predicaments see Collier, 2007a, and more amply, 
Collier 2007b. 
32  For the negative overall impact of protectionism on growth, see the quantitative inquiry in Milanovic 
(2005a). Cf. also IMF (2007a, p. 157) for the favourable impact of international trade on the relative 
position of the lower quintiles. 
33  For data on trade and financial globalization accompanying the high growth performance of developing 
economies in more recent times, especially since the nineties, see IMF (2007a, pp. 135-139). Trade 
globalization can be measured in terms of the increasing ratio of imports and exports to GNP, financial 
globalization as cross-border assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. Of course globalization is more than 
that, and includes globalization in technical knowledge, information, travel and contacts across countries, 
regions and continents. Technical progress in communications and transportation, together with 
international trade and financial liberalization, have much contributed to all aspects of globalization.  
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essentially because it is conducive to greater growth34 that spills over to the very poor.35 
However not necessarily globalization and growth, considering also the impact of technical 
progress, lead to an improvement of the worst off in relative terms36 and increased 
inequality could contribute to offset the positive impact on welfare of the increases in real 
incomes.37 As to the trend in income distribution, apparently the main culprit of recent 
increases in economic inequality in some areas of the planet seems to have been 
technological progress, by demanding skills and qualifications and substituting less skilled 
labour.38 On the other hand economic “globalization” (in the sense of an increase of trade 
and financial flows,39 with the first having an overall equalizing, the second a disequalizing 
effect) appears to have had a different impact in the different areas of the world. According 
to IMF (2007a) economic globalization is seen to increase inequality somewhat in 
developed countries (because of the prevailing impact of financial liberalization, while trade 
liberalization is seen to exert an equalizing impact anyway40) and decrease inequality in the 
less developed ones (because of the prevailing impact of trade liberalization).41 At the same 
time the diffusion of technological advances all over the world is obviously itself a 
manifestation of “globalization” and could hardly be isolated from the other intervening 
factors (such as for instance financial liberalization, since foreign direct investment in 
particular constitutes an essential vehicle for international technological transfers).  
                                                 
34  On the role of international trade and openness in conjuring development and economic progress see 
Dollar and Kray (2004) and the literature referred there. For a contrary, if rather unbalanced, view, see 
Milanovic (2003).  
35  “Evidence suggests that better growth is translating into declining poverty levels… for a sample of 19 low 
income countries, 1 percent of GDP growth was associated with a 1.3 percent fall in the rate of extreme 
poverty and a 0.9 percent fall in the $2-a-day poverty rate” (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). “Across all regions, 
the evidence therefore suggests that in an absolute sense the poor are no worse off (except in a few post-
crisis economies), and in most cases significantly better off, during the most recent phase of globalization“ 
“over the past two decades, income growth has been positive for all quintiles in virtually all regions and all 
income groups” (IMF, October 2007a, p. 141). 
36  Whether globalization leads to a reduction or to an increase in inequality is a contentious issue. See on this 
point Milanovic (2006) and the literature quoted by him. 
37  Milanovic, 2006, p. 13: “the process of globalization by itself changes the perception of one’s position, and 
even if globalization may raise everybody’s real income, it could exacerbate, rather than moderate, feelings 
of despondency and deprivation among the poor.” This could contribute to create the motivation for 
migrating towards more affluent countries, while increasing incomes can supply the resources for meeting 
the costs of migration, often a costly business in relation to the scant resources of the poorest of the earth. 
(On the effect that raising incomes in poorer countries such as India and China can have on increasing the 
emigration push towards richer ones see Bhagwati, 2007, p. 210.) Finally, migration can be in itself a 
cumulative process, since successful migrants can finance through their remittances the travel costs of those 
left behind, and, at the same time, contribute to reduce the other costs of emigration through the “friends 
and relatives effects”. 
38  Cf. IMF (2007a, pp. 139-141). 
39  This corresponds to the World Bank’s narrow definition of globalization as the “freedom and ability of 
individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries" (cf. 
Milanovic, 2002, p. 3).  
40  This appears to be contrary to what is implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but it may be explained 
by the reduction in the price of basic wage goods imported from developing countries, in particular, and by 
the reduction in the relative importance of worse paid manufacturing jobs (. IMF (2007a, pp. 155-156). As 
to the impact of financial liberalization in increasing inequalities both in developed and in underdeveloped 
countries this is attributed to the fact that “higher FDI inflows have increased the demand for skilled labor, 
whereas outward FDI in advanced economies has reduced the demand for relatively lower-skilled workers 
in these countries” (ibidem, p. 159). 
41  Cf. IMF, 2007a, ch. 4, pp. 135-170.  
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4.3.2 Aid and transfers 
As to transfers, it is hardly possible that transfers of the size needed to really bring 
about a significant reduction of world inequality in per capita income and wealth could be 
acceptable to the public opinions of better off countries;42 in general, the propensity to aid 
the poor of the world is quite widespread, especially in the “development buzz … 
generated by rock stars, celebrities and NGOs”43, but with somebody else’s money and 
resources. 44 As a prominent example we can mention the movement for international debt 
relief, where the proponents do not appreciate that the only radical way to suppress debt is 
to suppress credit, while insolvency makes international debt more risky, and therefore 
more onerous, and this is not necessarily in the interest of poorer countries.45 None of the 
vocal members of the debt remission campaign seems to have started an international 
voluntary subscription for paying off poorer countries’ debt by reimbursing the creditors, 
or advocating that government create an international special fund for the same purpose 
with taxpayers’ money, in order to eliminate, or reduce, the debt without worsening the 
credit rating of poorer debtors.46 Nevertheless the worsening of credit rating, and the 
consequent reduction in the capability to borrow, of poorer debtors could have some 
positive side.47 Often the debt problem arises from the propensity of populist and/or 
corrupt governments to over-borrow for financing consumption expenditures (the onus 
and unpopularity of servicing the debt will then fall on future governments), or the outright 
siphoning out of hard currency into the foreign bank accounts of the leaders. But a 
worsening of credit rating could also jeopardize the ability to borrow in an emergency or in 
an economic downturn, or for financing productive investment projects. An obvious fact 
that is overlooked by the debt remission campaign is that whenever the funds that have 
been borrowed are not repaid less is available for lending to other borrowers in need, and 
this is especially obvious with debts owed to the International Financial Institutions.48  
None of the many who deem just and natural that the pharmaceutical industry 
renounce exploiting the intellectual property of anti-Aids drugs, meritoriously discovered at 
the cost of huge investments, has proposed to start a subscription, or to pressurize 
governments for purchasing the corresponding patents at market value, in order to make 
them free for mankind, and in particular for the poorest and most affected by the disease 
section of world population, such as in Africa.49 An alternative, more practical, way to 
                                                 
42  The schemes that have been proposed in regard, reviewed by Milanovic (November 2007), seem utterly 
unrealistic. 
43  Collier, 2007b, p.4. 
44  As a prominent historical representative of the “somebody else’s money handouts” school we may 
mention Jeffrey Sachs. After all it is very easy for a practicing development economist to become popular 
with one’s charges by generously advocating the pledging of somebody else’s money. For a comprehensive 
criticism of past experience of aid and its bureaucratic implementation see Easterly (2006). For a hefty 
criticism of Easterly’s standpoint, and Easterly’s reply, see Sachs (2006) and Easterly (n.d). 
45  For the ambiguous aspects of debt relief, in particular that affecting the International Financial Institutions, 
see Easterly (2006), pp. 230-236. 
46  On the other hand the creation of such a special fund would bring about an obvious moral hazard 
problem. 
47  On this see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 216 f. 
48  Cf. Stiglitz, 2007, p. 228:“Today, the developing countries that have repaid what was owed … worry that 
debt relief is commandeering money that might otherwise have been available to them”. 
49 Some feasible projects of financing private or public medical research of specific relevance for poorer 
countries, and insufficiently financially rewarding for unfounded private medical research, with suitable 
contracts allowing poorer countries taking advantage through free access of the innovations thus produced, 
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overcome the issue of the excessive cost of patented drugs would be for poorer countries 
not to adhere to the international conventions protecting intellectual property rights, but 
this would put them outside the WTO, since TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights) has become a part of WTO agreements.50 As a matter of 
fact underdeveloped countries have little to gain and much to lose from the degree of 
protection of intellectual property rights contemplated by TRIPS. Even if they do not 
comply, still a large market (that of developed countries), where intellectual rights are 
protected, and innovation is financed by market proceeds, would remain.51 With the Doha 
Declaration (adopted in Doha, in November 2001 by the WTO Ministerial Conference) the 
extent of TRIPS has been attenuated, and some further development in this direction could 
be contemplated in future WTO negotiations.52 In theory a possible way to reconcile the 
objective of maintaining revenues and incentives for intellectual production with that of 
helping the less developed countries could be to transfer part of development aid 
expenditures to national producers of intellectual public goods (preferably through some 
general measures such as tax rebates), while allowing to the underdeveloped economies (or 
some subset of them such as the poorest ones) their free utilization.53 The downside is that 
lack of protection for intellectual goods could dampen their production in the 
underdeveloped countries themselves; at a certain stage of their development even less 
developed countries may decide that protection is worth the while. In practice it is hard to 
expect that developed countries, and especially the USA, could allow an attenuation of the 
protection of intellectual goods, owing to the intensity of the lobbying by the industries 
concerned. Indeed, the latter have already succeeded to extend the protection to much 
higher levels than what appears reasonable and economically justifiable.54 
                                                                                                                                               
have been proposed. This kind of schemes would have the advantage of helping poorer countries with aid 
expenditures bypassing corrupt and inefficient governments, helping, at the same time, the production of 
public goods useful for the whole of mankind. In general aid expenditure resulting in the creation of public 
goods that are of particular interest for poorer countries (for instance producing information or educational 
material) could by-pass their government and administrations and remedy at the same time the 
inefficiencies deriving from the insufficient provision of public goods. 
50  See the entry TRIPS in Wikipedia, and the sources listed there. [References from Wikipedia are usually 
shunned because of the way mistaken and inexactitudes can be incorporated (but also corrected) by 
everybody concerned. But a basic principle of Wikipedia is that all information should be supported by 
external sources to which one should refer for control. Moreover many articles are constantly updated and 
are of surprising depth and quality. I must take this opportunity to express my indebtedness to Wikipedia, 
one of the greatest intellectual achievements of our age, for constantly supplying a first information and 
direction on previously  uncharted territories.] 
51  On TRIPS and intellectual property issues concerning less developed countries see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 103-
132. 
52  An issue in this respect would be competitive export of goods benefiting of lack of intellectual protection 
to developed economies. But this may not be insurmountable, since the developed economies could 
undertake far-reaching specific import controls, as they do on many commodities in general. Of more 
practical relevance may be the lack of actual enforcement of the discipline concerning protection of 
intellectual property, whatever the theoretical obligations associated to the underwriting of TRIPS, and the 
legal measures implemented.  
53 There are also other profiles to be accounted for: intellectual production has low material and energy 
intensity, does not produce goods that must be disposed for at the end of their consumer cycle. Thus to 
shift from the production of material goods to the production of intellectual goods could have many 
advantages. 
54  For instance the extension of the economic protection of copyright after 50 years at least after the death of 
the author, contemplated by TRIPS (not to speak of the 70 years of the US or European legislation; see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries%27_copyright_length, and the sources listed there) seems 
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As far as aid in general is concerned there is the issue of the lasting effects of the 
culture of dependency in perpetuating the poverty trap, by facilitating the survival of 
corrupt and inefficient governments, and the old saying that international aid amounts to 
taking away from the poor of the donor countries for giving to the rich of the receiving 
countries, which, in its apparent paradox, may capture a relevant aspect of international 
aid.55 What is sometimes overlooked in popular discussions is that aid usually does not 
directly transfer resources to the poorer of the world, since it is governments that act as 
representatives of the inhabitants of a country (“aids goes to governments, not to poor 
people: much of it benefits relatively well-to-do groups”56), and governments in poorer 
countries are often comparatively more corrupt and inefficient.57 There is the damaging 
possibility that aid be simply wasted away and siphoned off by corrupt regimes, or, even 
worse, spent in armaments, feeding third world wars.58 It is argued that aid, analogously to 
natural resources windfalls, weakens the determination to reform and to combat corruption 
and may hamper growth through the so-called Dutch disease, by increasing prices and 
wage costs.59 Analogously to the rents from oil and natural resources, and even more than 
them, aid has been found to have a negative impact on democracy.60 Theoretically speaking 
aid could aid reform and better governance through ex-ante conditionality, but, besides 
                                                                                                                                               
hardly to be required to stimulate the production of intellectual works. How reasonable is it to expect that 
the motivation of an author towards intellectual creation be influenced by the economic property rights 
somebody else may have after his own death (not to speak 50 and more years after)? All this simply 
amounts to the imposition of rents for past production of intellectual goods, to the advantage of some who 
were not involved in their creation, reducing their diffusion and enjoyment, not to an incentive for future 
production, 
55  According to Knack (1999) “Aid dependence can undermine institutional quality by weakening 
accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, 
siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and 
institutions.” And “analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality 
of governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law.” For the 
tendency of aid to benefit corrupt and undemocratic governments, see Easterly, 2006, p.133: (according to 
him “aid shifts money from being spent by the best governments in the world to being spent by the 
worst”). For a discussion of this issue and of the way to overcome it see Milanovic (October 2007). To his 
plea for taking into account, in directing aid, the degree in inequality of income distribution in the receiving 
countries, “penalizing countries with highly unequal distribution” one may add that the degree of inequality 
may be seen as an indicator of the extraction power of the elite in a receiving country, and of its power to 
appropriate the advantages of transfers, increasing the probability of the latter acting regressively. 
56  Bauer, 1976b, p. 397. According to Milanovic (2005b, pp. 133-34) even random transfers from the poorest 
dicile of the richest countries with not too skewed income distribution (so this does not apply to rich 
inegalitarian countries such as the United States) to the richest decile of the poorest countries would make 
the international distribution of incomes less unequal, taking into account the relative positions in the 
international income distribution. But aid transfers are not random, and as long as they directly benefit the 
ruling political class in poor countries, whose revenues could be well above those of the upper decile, and 
they may turn out to make the international income distribution more unequal, rather than equal.  
57  We may refer in this respect to the classification of Transparency International. An extreme case is 
mentioned by Collier (2007b, p. 66): only 1% of the funds spent by the Government of Chad for financing 
rural health clinics actually reached them. Another less extreme case relates to Uganda, where “only around 
20 percent of the money that the Ministry of Finance released for primary schools, other than for teachers’ 
salaries, actually reached the schools” (p. 150). 
58  According to Collier (2007b, p. 103) “something around 40 percent of Africa’s military spending is 
inadvertently financed by aid”.  
59  Collier, 2007b, pp. 40 f. According to Collier (ibidem, p. 102) “large inflows of money without any 
restrictions do not seem to be well spent in many of the countries of the bottom billion.” 
60  See Djankov et alii (2006). 
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being strongly resented as a violation of sovereignty, and sometimes as a plot of richer 
countries to the detriment of aid receivers, smacking of paternalism, neo-colonialism, or 
even imperialism, ex-ante conditionality apparently does not work in practice, at least with 
respect to the poorer countries with worse governance.61 It is also doubtful whether 
massive aid transfers, as proposed by some, could raise the long term growth prospects, 
even if they could certainly increase the short-run average incomes (but not necessarily the 
incomes of the poor) of the recipient countries.62 According to Boone (1995) “Aid does not 
significantly increase investment and growth, nor benefit the poor”.63 There is presently a 
vast opinion on the negative aspects of aid, as exposed also in some recent bestsellers, but 
one may remind that many considerations that have become popular in recent times were 
voiced by Peter Bauer in times when they were considered politically incorrect and contrary 
to common opinion.64 Some more optimistic assessment could be reserved to specific 
forms of aid directly aiming to remove some kind of barrier to development, such as the 
aid-for-trade scheme, which is mired to remove the administrative and physical constraints 
to international trade.65 But here too there is the problem of assessing, aside from the 
intentions and the means, the effective destination and implementation of the aid effort. A 
much more effective and less complicated way, but perhaps hardly politically feasible, way 
to help the poorer countries to trade would be eliminate the restrictions on their imports in 
the markets of the richer countries, extending the system of generalized preferences to the 
areas where they are effectively competitive, such as “simple” manufactured products.  On 
the other hand there is a specific type of aid that the more prosperous countries are giving 
freely and massively, and mostly unintentionally, which mostly goes unremarked. Through 
the scientific progress and the technological advances they produce, they create public 
goods that deeply affect the economic and social fabrics of less developed countries. This is 
probably the fundamental explanation of the great economic and demographic advances of 
most less developed countries in relation to their past.66 The same applies to the example 
provided by the economic, social and political institutions of more developed countries, in 
particular to the basic idea of democracy, according to which governments should be 
changed by the ballot, rather than through civil strife and violent means. The latter have the 
fundamental disadvantage, in comparison to the ballot, to be usually much more expensive 
in terms of wasted economic resources, not to speak of the other, non-economic, profiles. 
Of course ballots serve their purpose if they are credible, this means not fundamentally 
rigged, otherwise sham democracy is not of much use. 
                                                 
61  Collier (2007b), pp. 109-110. For a consideration how aid could be tailored to really help the development 
of  “the bottom million”, see Collier’s chapter 7, pp. 99-123. 
62  For a sceptical view on the ability of aid to raise growth of the recipient countries, see in particular Easterly, 
2006, ch. 2, pp. 60-55. For a recent survey of the literature on the effectiveness of aid to enhance the 
growth prospects of poor countries, and a more positive conclusion, see Arndt et al. (2009). An argument 
making ethically desirable massive income transfers to the poorer countries of the world that is frequently 
advanced refers to the twin legacies of slave trade and colonialism. We shall return on this issue later on, in 
section 5.. 
63  For the discussion following Boone’s controversial paper, and further interesting contributions on the 
issue, see Easterly (2006), pp. 45-50. The fact that mere handouts to the governments of more backward 
countries may not be able to improve their development prospects is borne out by the curse of natural 
resources, whereby rents from natural resources would not help, but rather hinder successful economic 
development. 
64  See for instance Bauer, 1976b, pp. 95 f. 
65  Cf. Njinkeu and Cameron, 2008. 
66  See below, tables 5 to 9. 
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4.3.3 Changing the basis of the international economic order 
As to changing the basis of the international economic order from free exchange 
and market to supernational planned allocation and material barters, even aside from the 
concrete issue of its (in)feasibility, the past Comecon experience of planned material 
exchanges is not really enticing; the same applies to the other historical instances where 
barter exchange prevailed, with consequent high transaction costs and greatly reduced gains 
from trading. To some extent distribution is internationally, alike inside nations, a 
consequence of the institutions that regulate and, directly or indirectly, affect production 
and exchange. The institutions that may favour high levels of productivity and growth, 
such as the remarkable performance of the developing countries, aside from the 
unfortunate “bottom billion”, reaching in the last two decades of the last century the 
unprecedented rate of 4 per cent of per capita income growth, and even more in the first 
years of the new millennium,67 have some distributional consequences that only partially 
can be mitigated without affecting economic outcomes. Thus to radically change those 
institutions could be against the interest of the world poor, despite the deep injustice of a 
world where at least 60% of one’s position in the global personal income distribution can 
be explained by the accident of being born in a country instead than somewhere else, and a 
good deal of the rest by the accident of having been born in a family rather than in 
another.68 In reality the greatest practical opportunities for redistribution appear to lie 
inside countries through reform of their institutions and the political process. In lower and 
middle income countries, particularly in those with good natural resource endowments, the 
specific extractive nature of the institutions, enhanced by the absence of checks and 
balances, often leads to the formation of high incomes based on rents, whereby the 
resulting high degree of inequality (at a Gini coefficient of 40 and above) represents a brake 
to growth rather than a by-product of growth-enhancing institutions and social processes,69 
not to speak of the much higher risk of civil war and instability associated with 
“dependence upon primary commodity exports”.70 
The most radical way to overcome this issue would be the cosmopolitan one to 
make of the world a single country, with the power and responsibility to decide and enact 
redistribution policies. One could only (idly) speculate about the kinds of institutions and 
economic governance such a cosmopolitan world would have. But for good or for worse 
                                                 
67  Collier, 2007b, p. 8. This finds a counterpart in the transformation of trade and the economic basis, 
whereby actually “80 percent of developing countries exports are manufactures, and service exports are also 
mushrooming.” (Ibidem, p. 81.) 
68  See Milanovic (2008). Owing to the very high relative premium of changing country in relation to the 
restricted probabilities of advancement by remaining in a poor country, the pressure to migrate must be 
very high from poorer countries, especially towards rich countries where income distribution is more 
egalitarian (supposing the expected destination of the migrants to be mostly in the lower distributional 
range of the countries of immigration). In turn this may contribute to bring about a lesser egalitarian 
distribution in the receiving countries, in particular because of lower propensity towards redistribution and 
interclass solidarity as a consequence of increased ethnic differentiation and the immigration pressure. 
69  See Nel (2006), pp. 697-698 and the literature quoted there. 
70  Collier 2007b, p. 21. According to Collier some international charter agreed among all main industrial 
partners requiring  greater transparency in the conditions of exploitation of natural resources, and the 
utilization of the rents thereof, would be of great help in improving the way in which those revenues are 
spent. To the obvious objection that China’s unconditional scrambling for the underdeveloped world’s 
natural resources would break any conceivable charter, Collier’s rather unpersuasive counterargument is 
that “The West has to offer China greater inclusion in power in return for adherence to international 
standards.” (Ibidem, p. 146.)  
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humanity is divided into separate territorial states, and solidarity towards the citizens of 
other states is usually much weaker than solidarity towards fellow citizens, or, even more, 
especially where there are strong ethnic divisions inside states, towards one’s own ethnic 
community. Moreover measures of solidarity are also the outcome of the fact that citizens, 
however destitute, are partaking into, and therefore have some scope for influencing 
through collective action, the political process, albeit with quite different degrees, according 
to its specific characteristics. Thus “the state is, for the time being, the only legitimate 
context within which relative deprivation can be addressed through redistributive policies 
and practices”, and “it is at the level of states only that the principles of distributive justice 
can and may apply, as it is on this level alone that we have the institutional means to 
legitimately take from the rich and give to the poor”. For good or for worse, people will 
belong to separate states for a long time to come, rather than being simply citizens of the 
world, and this will limit the degree of solidarity and redistribution at the world level.71 John 
Lennon’s utopia of Imagine there's no countries …. Nothing to kill or die for -- And no religion too is 
still very far off.72 
4.3.3.1 Breaking the actual international economic order with the violence of the worse off 
We have seen that a suitable alternative to the basic principles of the actual 
international economic order and to increasing globalization does not seem to exist. As to a 
general process of income redistribution among the states of the world, this seems utterly 
unrealistic (and not necessarily productive of a substantial betterment of the situation of 
the worse off of the world). But let us suppose that redistribution is forced by the less 
developed countries through violence, analogously to what has often happened in the 
historical past, when the civilizations of the Middle East, South- East Asia and Europe 
were invaded or taken at ransom by warlike “barbaric” peoples coming down from the 
fringes of the civilized centre. Could a forced world redistribution through violence be 
achieved? Let us suppose that conquest and domination by the less developed could be 
achieved through the unwillingness of the more developed to resort to the means available 
to defend themselves (such as for instance the use of atomic power). Could this bring 
betterment and prosperity to the masses of the poor of the world? This seems hardly a 
possibility. The idea that an advanced country, whose main wealth is the stock of its human 
capital could be run through domination and violent coercion to the benefit of some 
conqueror, much poorer because endowed with much less human capital, does not seem 
realistic.73 And it seems also unrealistic that under some hypothetic circumstances the 
ruling elite of the conquering state would exert its exploitation of the conquered to the 
benefit of the poor of their state rather than of itself. We shall return later on these issues  
4.3.4 The problem of the “fragile” states 
A related problem to which no easy solution can be seen is that of the so-called 
fragile states, “countries with particularly weak governance, institutions, and 
capacity…often in conflict”74 (where either internal or external conflicts are often at the 
                                                 
71  Cf. Neal, 2006, pp.702-703. 
72  On the other hand to have peoples belonging to different sovereign constituencies (“states”) can be 
optimal if people are clustered in groups with distinct culture and preferences (cf. on this Muller 2005), this 
means until “globalization” will eventually have unified culture and prevailing preferences all over the 
world. But even in this case some technical problems of managing very large constituencies could lead to 
the optimal subdivision of the world into distinct sovereign states.  
73  See Simon (1989), p. 175. 
74  World Bank (2007, pp. 2-3). 
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origin of “fragility”), which did not partake of recent world economic growth, and are 
plagued by particularly severe problems of extreme poverty, high child mortality, and 
illiteracy. Short of neo-colonialist endeavours, which could hardly be a choice, the only way 
seems to hope that, favoured by the impact of globalization and institutional imitation, and 
possibly through the help of the international community, their internal dynamics could 
evolve so as to bring about a more favourable environment, in particular through the 
overcoming of the violent conflicts often at the origin of “fragility”. Indeed, as argued by 
Collier (2007b, p. 31), a greater participation in peace keeping by the international 
community, in order to reduce the probability of conflict reversion, could be the best form 
of aid. As to peace enforcing, and nation and institution building, this is a much more 
tricky issue, because of its neo-colonialist connotations and implied violation of national 
sovereignty, lack of consensus by the international community, and lack of volunteers to 
offer the needed resources and face the inevitable losses and expenditures. The history of 
humanity is a long history of horrors. We surely cannot do anything about the horrors of 
the past. Probably we cannot do much about the horrors of the future. Only a delirium of 
omnipotence can lead us to believe that we should be able to deal with all the horrors of 
the present. We may just be left with the solution of ending the patronizing approach,75 
leaving fragile states to do their own experiences, as everybody else has done in the past, 
and learn through generations how to progress, forming and changing their own 
institutions. But our world has become much more impatient with historical time, the 
perceptions of contemporary horrors is enhanced by the spread of information and of 
visual representation all over the world, and we have become used to the idea that, by 
resorting to appropriate techniques, reforms, and interventions, we could solve all human 
and social problems. Moreover a country’s internal disturbances may severely impact on its 
neighbours, not only as a consequence of the collapse of trade following the collapse of the 
economy, but especially by originating massive sudden migrations, and by the spreading 
abroad of internal disturbances, as well as diseases.76 We may just remind the disastrous 
consequences of Ruanda’s internal conflicts on Congo/Zaire or, quite recently, of 
Mugabe’s autocratic follies for the internal peace of South Africa, and of the internal 
conflict and absence of a state in Somalia for the safety of sea routes. A paradigmatic case 
is the massive influx of refugees (estimated at 11 million) from Bangladesh to India after 
the Pakistan military repression in 1971, amounting to “demographic aggression”, and 
prompting the Indian intervention in the conflict, resulting in Bangladesh independence.77 
The consequences of failed states on the outside world can be indeed very severe, even if 
only the economically measurable aspects are taken into consideration.78 
4.3.5 Migration 
A way to mitigate the plight of the worse off, as well as of remedying the injustice 
of the strict interrelation between somebody’s place of birth and vastly different life 
prospects, could be to allow unrestricted immigration from the poorer to the richer 
                                                 
75  The latter is exposed and lamented by Easterly, and others (cf. Easterly, 2006, pp. 26-27). 
76  Cf. Collier, 2007b, p. 31. 
77  Cf. Marwah, 1979, p. 560. 
78  According to a rough estimate by Collier (2007b, p.103) the “costs of a typical civil war” are around $ 64 
billion. Collier’s quantitative analysis, as well his favourable attitude to peace keeping and peace 
enforcement, are severely criticized by Easterly (2007), according to whom “If Collier’s statistical analysis 
does not hold up under scrutiny, unfortunately, then his recommendations are not a reliable guide for 
deploying foreign aid, technical assistance, or armies. Economists should not be allowed to play games with 
statistics, much less with guns” (p. 1476).  
 24 
countries. Indeed, “controlling for country of birth, country of education, years of 
education, work experience, sex, and rural-urban residence” the real wage an average 
migrant worker receives in his home country is only a fraction of what he may receive in 
the United States,79 or indeed in almost any OECD country. So long as the wage 
differences reflect differences in productivity this also implies an obvious massive 
inefficiency in the world allocation of manpower. For the average worker of a poor country 
the difference is enhanced by the much lower probability that somebody born in a poor 
country could achieve the same degree of education as one born in an affluent one. 
Considering the huge differences in per capita incomes and living standards, and that the 
prospect of improving one’s lot in a poorer country is bound to be much greater through 
emigration than through internal advancement80 we may easily understand why the pressure 
towards immigration in the richer countries appears almost irresistible. Taking into account 
the overall number of the world poor, one can appreciate the enormous migratory 
potential towards the more prosperous (or even the less poor) countries in a shrinking 
world, with potential far-reaching social and political consequences. Countries of 
emigration become at the same time countries of immigration from even poorer countries, 
such as notably in the case of Eastern Europe as a whole, or of North Africa.81 In the usual 
model of international trade free migration leads to greater efficiency (in the sense at least 
of the principle of compensation:: those who are gaining gain more than what others are 
losing), but the political and social consequences of unrestricted migration in the 
immigration countries, which could deeply affect the social fabric, and thus the conditions 
of production, investment, and exchange, are not considered. At present those who 
succeed in reaching the heaven of a richer country have at least a heaven where to turn on. 
If present world heavens were reduced to hell, reproducing the illnesses of the countries 
from which people are flying, there would be no heaven anymore. Indeed, in case the 
obstacles to immigration were drastically reduced by abolishing the administrative 
constraints, as seemingly advocated by Bhagwati,82 and more or less explicitly by many 
others,83 the logical consequence would be an intensification of migration flows, up to the 
point where the worse off in the better off countries are about as good off, or rather as bad 
off, as the worse off in the worst off countries. In theory, following massive migration the 
lot of the inhabitants of the worse-off countries could improve, because of lower pressure 
on national resources, and reduced labour supply, to the point of stamping off further 
massive migratory pressures. O’Rourke (2004), considering the experience of the great 
migratory flows out of Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries arrives at the 
conclusion that” emigration is a self-limiting process”, since it brings about a reduction in 
the gap between the wage levels of the source and of the receiving countries. This cannot 
be generalized to the present situation, however, because of the huge gap in living 
standards, much higher than during the historical period of the great transatlantic 
migration, the present great differences in demographic potential, the lower relevance in 
the present world of the population pressure on agricultural resources as an inducement to 
                                                 
79  Clemens et al. (2008). 
80  See above p. 20. 
81  On South-South migrations see Hujo and Piper, 2007. 
82  Bhagwati, 2007, pp. 217-218. 
83  Quite often whatever limitation to immigration flows is blamed for its unsavoury (and to some extent 
inevitable) humanitarian consequences, without explicitly advocating free immigration. But to criticize any 
limitation to immigration flows logically amounts to the advocacy of unrestricted immigration. 
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emigration. In the times of the great transatlantic migrations the main economic activity 
was agriculture, and migratory flows were directed towards territories that were sparsely 
populated and endowed with plentiful natural resources, from countries where the density 
of population was much greater. Moreover there were probably no significant differences 
in human capital between the inhabitants of the European Offshoots and the European 
migrants. As a consequence migration served the development of overseas territories (at 
the expense of the original inhabitants), while acting toward wage reduction there, and 
resulted in a betterment of living conditions and in an increase of wage rates, as well as in a 
dramatic reduction in inequality at home, so that emigration acted as “a self limiting 
process” (O’Rourke, 2004, pp. 9-10). Present conditions are quite different. Often 
migration is from less densely populated to more densely populated countries (such as 
from Africa to Europe, or from CIS countries towards central and western Europe). 
Agriculture, and especially small scale agriculture, where decreasing returns are particularly 
important, does not have the relevance nowadays that it had in the previous centuries. The 
scarce resources that hold down development are not in general natural resources,84 but 
rather human and social capital, and this scarcity is not cured by emigration to more 
advanced countries. Some relief could be derived by the degree of migration that the richer 
countries are ready to accept. But the consequences of migration for those left in the 
poorer countries are by no means straightforward. On the one hand there are the 
advantages of the remittals, and the lower demographic pressure on scarce natural 
resources and the environment, on the other potentially huge losses of human capital. The 
latter however could be partially compensated by the brain gain of return immigrants85 and 
the transfer of knowledge and ideas that some systematic contact with migrants abroad, 
favoured by the extraordinary development of communication networks, can conjure. 86  
In practice, under the present circumstances the consequences in the richer 
countries of a sustained period of unrestricted immigration could be disastrous for equality 
and social cohesion, possibly leading to the same degree of ethnic violence plaguing the 
most unfortunate of the developing countries, with negative economic consequences, 
which could reverberate disastrously on the poorer countries themselves, since trade and 
other interaction opportunities would be negatively affected.87 In this sense unrestricted 
immigration could bring about an instance of the “tragedy of the commons”, by which the 
value of having better off countries where to be able to migrate, to trade with, and from 
which be able to import public goods, such as technical and social innovations, would all 
                                                 
84  Indeed abundant natural resources have been long believed (see Mun, 1664), and are believed now too, to 
act as a potential drag to development, increasing the tendency towards corruption and rent seeking.  
85  Cf.  Mayr and Peri, 2008. 
86  “The emigration of skilled labor may not be negative for the sending country. In the first place, emigration 
of talent may provide a positive signal that motivates others in the sending country to acquire more 
education, thereby raising human capital and possibly promoting growth. Second, emigrants may, in due 
course, return or, through networks and resource repatriation (such as through remittances), provide 
essential inputs to new businesses and activities in the sending country. Third, emigration may actively 
promote a more effective flow of knowledge and information. Fourth, the changing nature of mobility—in 
part due to major advances in communications technology—may be limiting the extent to which skills are 
actually lost “ (Commander et al.,  2004, p. 236). On the other hand “studies of return migration suggest 
that those who return may be those that have performed relatively poorly when abroad; the best migrants 
tend to stay” (ibidem, p. 259). 
87  For a discussion of the issue of what the overall consequences of unrestricted immigration could be, see 
Chilosi, 2002. 
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but destroyed.88 But such an outcome is rather theoretical., since at a certain stage of the 
process the tensions of sudden massive immigration would lead to the introduction of 
measures for its further containment. After all, no country in the world does admit free 
immigration. As Bhagwati himself reminds us (2007. p. 218) “immigration restrictions are 
the flip side of sovereignty”. 
Even if the potential for migration lies in the huge differences in per capita incomes 
between the rich and the poor countries, it not really true that a lessening of migratory 
pressure could derive from some increase in the living standards of the latter. Up to a 
certain point the contrary could well be true. Emigration, in particular illegal emigration can 
be very expensive in relation to the living standards of the poorer countries. If those 
standards increase, the resources available for financing immigration increase too. As a 
consequence migration pressures may increase rather than decrease. In the end the relation 
between relative living standard and emigration can have the usual shape of a inverted U 
curve, so that in order to be able to dampen immigration pressures the increase in the 
living standards of the poorer countries needs to be substantial. Looking back at history. 
this is compatible with the fact that  in the nineteenth century “mass emigration started 
earlier in the richer countries of north-west Europe than in the poorer countries of 
southern and eastern Europe” (O’Rourke, 2004, p. 9). In particular, during the Irish famine 
emigration from Ireland to the New World was stronger from the richer than from the 
poorer counties (ibidem). The increasing immigration pressures of recent times could be a 
manifestation, not only of the great distress that a number of countries of emigration are 
facing, or of increasing “globalization”, or of the remittances and support of previous 
migrants reducing migration costs, but also of the overall economic progress of the 
underdeveloped world, especially during the past two decades.89  
5. Soul-searching and self-bashing 
Tied to the issue of the evaluation of the present economic order is the issue of the 
historical responsibility of the West in the plight of the Rest. Overall the impact of the 
West has been mixed.90 On the one hand it has played with greater efficacy, owing to its 
recent technological and organizational superiority, the same deadly games played by most 
of humanity for most of the time. On the other it has spread modern social and 
technological innovations, with dramatic long-run consequences in terms of improvement 
of the economic and living standards of most of the Rest. It has also spread its germs, with 
a deadly impact for some populations, in particular in South America.91 But in the historical 
                                                 
88 For a kind of “tragedy of the commons” of excessive immigration, destroying the value of citizenship in 
the immigration country, see Pejovich, 2010. 
89  The absolute level of per capita incomes in the developing world as a whole has kept  increasing even in 
the “lost decade” of the eighties, and growth has accelerated in the  nineties, reaching quite respectable 
levels in  the first decade of the new millennium. The performance has been quite unequal, and the 
aggregate indicators have been disproportionately affected by the strong performance of China and India 
(both strong emigration countries with great demographic potential; see White and Subedi, 2008). But per 
capita incomes in all the areas of the less developed world have on the whole kept increasing, together with 
its population, another source of immigration pressure, albeit at quite unequal speed (cf. the “Key 
Development Data & Statistics” at the World Bank internet site: http://www.worldbank.org/). On the 
progressive intensification of migratory processes and their quantitative assessment see Oecd (2009) and 
Oecd (2008).   
90  For a concise assessment of the mixed impact of the West on the Rest, cf. Woodruff, 1983 [1966], the 
“Epilogue”, pp. 335-341. 
91  See Woodruff, 1983 [1966], p. 340; Diamond (1997). 
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interaction of peoples it is difficult to do cherry-picking: the same technological and 
organizational dominance that has made the West deadly for some has brought about the 
improvement of the living standards of the many through almost universal imitation. 
How much are the plight of poorer countries and the affluence of richer ones due 
to colonialism? And how much is the misery of Africa in particular a consequence of the 
transatlantic slave trade? How much does the responsibility of the latter fall on European 
shoulders?  
5.1 Colonialism 
Branko Milanovic has recently produced an interesting inquiry into the first issue 
(Milanovic, 2005a). According to his quantitative analysis on a large historical statistical 
data base, colonialism has not appreciably helped nor damaged on balance the economic 
development either of colonial powers or of colonies.This is consistent with the fact that 
“colonies accounted for only a minor share of the trade and investment of developed 
countries in the nineteenth century, and most of the greatly expanded world trade and 
investment was carried on within the developed bloc itself” (Easterlin, 1996, p 2). “In the 
half century before World War I the market for developed countries’ exports were chiefly 
in other developed  countries, and the principal suppliers of primary products requirements 
of the developed countries were other developed countries…Considering Great Britain, 
France, and Germany together, on the eve of World War II, their own Third World 
colonies accounted for only 11 percent of their merchandise trade and 12 percent of their 
foreign investment” (ibidem, p. 43).92 One must also consider that the advantages of 
empire, the exploitation of the colonies to the benefit of the metropolis, must be balanced 
with the costs of empire, military, human, administrative, and of infrastructural investment. 
At the same time colonies were usually long term beneficiaries, albeit in different measure 
according the type of colonial domination, of infrastructural investment and of the 
importation of modern technological and administrative innovations, and could benefit 
from the opening to the international economy. 93 In particular the colonial status did not 
hinder the fast development of the European Offshoots. Milanovic study confirms 
Bairoch’s view concerning the lack of noticeable positive consequences of colonial empires 
on the economic development of the metropolis. Indeed, as Bairoch remarks (p. 673), if 
one looks at the growth performance of European countries in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries those who grew the most were the countries without colonies, and this 
applies even more to the USA (p. 674). As far as colonies are concerned, Milanovic’s 
inquiry considers the growth performance of former colonies before and after 
independence, in relation to that of the rest of the world, and no particular change is 
detected after independence.94 But an interpretation could be that on average an 
exploitative structure is substituted to another. Thus one is left then with the question 
whether the responsibility for accommodating the country along an exploitative path could 
be attributed to the colonial rule itself. According to Bairoch (p. 665) the economic 
development of the colonies was damaged by an exploitative “colonial pact” to the benefit 
of the metropolis (pp. 665-668). One is however somewhat puzzled by the fact that this 
                                                 
92  Cf. also Bairoch, 1997, pp. 675-678. 
93  On this see Bauer, 1969, pp. 53-55. 
94  Even more, as shown by Milanovic  (2005b, pp. 61-81) an overwhelming number of former colonies, in 
particular the African ones, fared quite badly after independence, much worse than under colonial rules, 
with dismal economic consequences. 
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“pact”, hindering the development of manufacturing industry in the colonies, applied also 
to the colonies of European settlement (p. 667): it does not seem that the development of 
the “Western Offshoots” did suffer because of this in the long-run, as purportedly 
happened to the third world colonies. In a sense this is an issue of counterfactuals: what 
would have happened if there had been no colonial rule. There are some reason to suppose 
that the persistence of pre-colonial regimes would not have led to greater economic 
progress.95 Perhaps the only way to answer this question is to look at the different 
performance of countries and territories that were not subjected to colonial rule vs. those 
that were subjected. Unfortunately the sample of the latter is rather limited. It could be 
enriched including those territories that were independent since long (say Haiti or Liberia) 
to be compared with those that achieved independence since the 1960s. Perhaps the only 
obvious conclusion that can be reached is that the colonial territories that were subjected to 
massive population transfers from Europe (the “Western Offshoots”) fared even better 
than the metropolis, while those populations that, because of remoteness or inhospitable 
territories, were immune to the colonial encroachment continued their ancient modes of 
living, with all its advantages and disadvantages. Some additional casual remarks may be in 
place: Thailand, that remained independent, fared rather well in the long run, but no better 
than their previously colonized neighbours, such as South Korea or Taiwan or Malaysia. 
Japan, that underwent the near-colonial shock of Commodore Perry’s intrusion in 1853 
fared very well and became a powerful industrial country, part itself since 1895 of the world 
of colonizers. Haiti, which was independent since the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
fared badly, much worse than other Caribbean nations which gained independence more 
recently. Of course, even in the more favourable cases, colonization, aside from the 
distasteful aspects of foreign domination, leads to a deep intrusion in the very identity of 
the colonized peoples. But to the same analogous intrusion and estrangement from their 
traditional heritage leads the globalization of our times. When one refers to the 
responsibility of colonialism one has to deal with this kind of questions for which it is not 
easy to produce a plausible answer: would have the countries colonized fared any better 
without colonial conquest? Would the alternative to colonization by western powers have 
been peaceful progress rather than continuous backwardness, persistent violence and 
frequent wars? As far as the impact of colonizers on the latter issue is concerned colonial 
domination brought in general some kind of colonial peace, whereby the frequent 
murderous pre-colonial wars were restricted and some kind of order maintained by the 
colonial power, even if the imposed order on the colonized peoples was of quite different 
nature according to the quality of the colonial rule.96 
                                                 
95  See Bauer, 1969, pp. 56 f. 
96  See for instance the difference between the much better order imposed by the Canadian government that 
tended to respect the treaties struck with the indigenous tribe,s “by regularly delivering the commodities 
and cash annuities promised and by preventing white encroachment”, from that in the United Stated, where 
Indian treaties were not respected and where “if funds were available, they were often skimmed by corrupt 
officials and traders” and where “grazing or squatting on Indian land was ignored or even encouraged”. “By 
and large, Canadian justice was even handed; both white and Indian malefactors were caught and 
punished”, while “in the U.S. and Mexican realms, crimes committed against Indians went unpunished or 
were punished less severely than similar offenses against whites” (Keeley, 1996, pp. 154-155). There is no 
need however to remind the genocidal “pacifications” of local populations, either involuntary through 
germs, or voluntarily through mass murder and eradication (such as in the notorious case of German 
Namibia).  
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Moreover colonialism has a long history, much before western colonization: indeed, 
“colonization is a constant feature of the history of mankind.”97 All the empires of 
antiquity, up to the more recent Arab or Ottoman empires were colonizers before western 
colonialism, partaking with the latter the following features (singled out by Bairoch) 1. the 
imposition of the civilization of the colonizers; 2. the subordination of the colonies to the 
interest of the metropolis; 3. ethnical and religious discrimination.98 
However repulsive for our modern sensibility is the imperialist idea to conquer a 
militarily weaker territory and rule it by force in the interest of the conqueror, the countries 
that were conquered and subjected to colonial domination were not usually peaceful 
prosperous heavens. By and large the West and the Rest were players of the same historical 
game, of violent territorial expansion and domination, war, plunder, and conquest, that 
only quite recently has been relinquished and declared illegal by greatest part of humanity.99 
In the history of humanity evil has always been banal, or, even more, what we moderns 
consider evil was often not seen as such, or was simply cloaked under false pretensions, 
such as saving through conversion the souls of the infidels, as in the 1455 Papal Bull 
Romanus Pontifex, legitimizing the slave trade100, or King Leopold’s pretence to administer 
Congo for exclusive humanitarian purposes. The history of mankind is a dense collection 
of actions of the kind that nowadays are defined as crimes against humanity; even 
genocides can be extolled in sacred books as acts of pious obedience to God.101 As is often 
the case in what we may see as the progress of the moral awareness of humanity some 
activities that in an epoch are considered as legitimate, are subsequently perceived as 
crimes.  
5.2 Slavery 
Let us turn now to the specific responsibility of the West on slavery. Slavery has 
been practiced by humanity from time immemorial, and probably very few parts of the 
earth have been immune. Africa has certainly been no exception.102 Trans-Saharan slave 
trade in particular was practised to a large scale before the encroachment of the Europeans, 
but slave trade towards Asia was also substantial.103 With the advantage of European 
technology and organization, and pulled by the demand of the new plantation economies 
of the New World, slave trade reached from the sixteenth century onward unheard of 
dimensions. But in partaking blames and responsibilities one should consider that 
European traders were taking care (so to speak) of transport and marketing, while the 
actual production of slaves was the domain of the Africans themselves and, even before 
the transatlantic trade, the capture and trade of slaves was one of the main economic 
activities of Sub-Saharan Africa. If to the demerit and shame of the Europeans should be 
                                                 
97  “La colonisation est une constante de l’ histoire de l’ humanité. L’ histoire de la colonisation se confond 
presque avec l’ histoire universelle.” (Bairoch, 1997), p. 548. 
98  Bairoch, 1997, p. 549 
99  For the overall world picture see in particular Ringrose (2001). For an outline of the history of African 
autochthonous kingdoms and empires and of their wars, see Collins and Burns (2007). As to South America 
there is no need to remind the extreme violence characterizing the autochthonous pre-Colombian empires. 
For the usual bellicosity and extreme violence of the “peoples without history” on which colonialism 
encroached, see Keeley (1996). 
100 Maddison, 2006, p 60. 
101 Such as in the story of Saul and the Amalekites in the Bible. 
102 The oldest documentation of slavery in Africa dates back to 2900 BC (Collins and Burns, p. 202).  
103 Cf. Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 202-247; Maddison, 2006, pp. 574-575. Hellie, 2007. 
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ascribed the massive extent of the transatlantic trade, to their merit and honour it must be 
attributed having made slave trade and slavery illegal, extending the prohibition of slavery 
to their colonial domains, thus bringing eventually to an end a time immemorial historical 
tradition of legal slavery and legal slave trade. 104  
Table 5. Yearly average rates of population growth 1-2007 (in percentages) 
 1-1000 
1000-
1500 
1500-
1820 
1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
1950-
1973 
1973-
2001 
2001-
2007 
Western 
Europe 
0.06 0.16 0.26 0.69 0.77 0.42 0.71 0.32 0.26 
Eastern 
Europe 
0.03 0.15 0.31 0.77 0.92 0.26 1.01 0.32 -0.03 
Former USSR 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.97 1.33 0.38 1.44 0.54 -0.15 
Western 
offshootsa) 
0.05 0.07 0.44 2.86 2.07 1.25 1.54 1.09 0.94 
Latin America 0.07 0.09 0.07 1.25 1.63 1.96 2.73 1.96 1.3 
Japan 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.95 1.32 1.14 0.55 0.06 
Total Asia excl. 
Japan 
0.00 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.55 0.92 2.19 1.80 1.29 
Africa 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.40 0.75 1.64 2.37 2.69 2.36 
World 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.93 1.93 1.62 1.20 
Source of the data of the last column:, U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at 
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/agggen; the remaining data are taken from Maddison (2006), p. 637. a)USA, 
Canada, New Zealand, Australia. 
6. The population explosion  
In a secular (or rather millennial) perspective, before the Industrial Revolution 
population growth was held in check by high mortality rates, which were accompanying 
high birth rates. The source of high mortality rates in a classical Malthusian perspective 
could have been the limitation in the amount of available agricultural resources, either 
continuously, leading to poor nutrition (and therefore to higher morbidity and premature 
deaths), or episodically, through famines. But there were also other forces at play.105 First of 
all very high rates of child mortality, either through systematic infanticide (itself probably a 
function of available resources), especially of females, or as a consequences of neglect and 
                                                 
104 Notable were in particular the British 1807 “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade" and the 1833 
“Slavery Abolition Act”. But sporadic measures for the abolition of slavery and or/slave trade were taken 
even before, such as the abolition of slave trade by Denmark in 1792, effective in 1803. In ancient times 
Cyrus the Great decreed the abolition of slavery in the Persian Empire in 539 BC, and the Chinese emperor 
Wang Mang in China at the beginning of the Christian Era. For a more comprehensive picture see Hellie 
(2007) or Wikipedia’s entry “Abolition of Slavery Timeline” (as of 14/9/09);. for the long path leading to 
the legal abolition of slavery in the twentieth century, see Miers, 2003, Bairoch, 738-740, 778-782. The 
last countries where slavery was legally abolished were the Arab countries: Saudi Arabia in 1962, 
Mauritania in 1981. Illegal or semi-legal slavery unfortunately still exists in many countries (besides Miers’ 
authoritative volume, see Bales, 2004, and Wikipedia’s entry “Slavery in Modern Africa”(as of 14/9/09)). 
For the persistence of slavery in Mauritania see Amnesty International, 2002. For the place of slavery in 
Islam and some contemporary authoritative opinions by Islamic scholars legitimizing slavery see the entry 
“Islam and Slavery” of Wikipedia (accessed 14/9/2009) and the sources quoted there. 
105 In Malthus’ own words: “The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every cause, 
whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural duration of 
human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labour 
and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, 
the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine.” Malthus 1826 [1798], I.II.9. 
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of poor living, childbearing, and childrearing conditions. Second, possible neglect of the 
elders, the disabled and the infirm. Third the spread of epidemic diseases (which was 
favoured by overcrowding and poor living conditions in the cities of agricultural societies).  
 
Table 6. Average Life Expectancy for Groups A and B, 1000–1999 (years at birth; average for both sexes) 
 1000  1820  1900  1950  1999 
Group A  24  36  46  66  78 
Group B  24  24  26  44  64 
World  24  26  31  49  66 
Source: Maddison (2006), p. 33. Group A: Western Europe, Western Offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), and Japan. Group B is the rest of the world. 
 
Then, endemic warfare, between tribes, nations or individuals, leading to direct deaths, 
spread of disease106, as well as to misdirection and destruction of the resources otherwise 
available for survival.107 Still, following the improvements of agricultural technology in 
particular, as well the development of the trade economy and “Smithian” growth, there was 
some population growth at a very slow pace, slightly accelerating in time, as shown in table 
5.108 Later on, especially since the middle of the nineteenth century, the decrease in 
mortality rates (a true “mortality revolution” “which has resulted in doubling or more of 
average life expectancy at birth”109 and has been the direct consequence of medical 
discoveries, and of the diffusion of medical knowledge, as well as hygiene, that has 
followed with some delay the Industrial Revolution) has led to a much faster population 
growth. At the same time the demographic consequences of two world wars and related 
upheavals are shown in a temporary decrease of population growth rates. The post World 
War II period has seen an unprecedented population explosion, indeed the rate of growth 
of world population has never been so high as after WWII. There are some signs of abating 
however following increasing living standards and progresses in the technology of birth 
                                                 
106 Such as most famously in the case of the European Black Death of the half of the 14-th century, 
originating allegedly from the siege by the Mongol army (where the plague was endemic) of the Genovese 
trade city of Caffa in Crimea in 1447. 
107 According to Ember (1978) about 60% of the societies of hunter-gatherers of which there is 
documentation were recorded to be at war at least once every two years. Even more drastic is the picture 
traced by Keeley (1996) concerning the propensity to war and violence of ancient and modern pre-historical 
societies (pre-historical in the sense of “people without written history”). As to pre-industrial civilizations it 
is enough to recall European and world history (for instance, considering European history immediately 
preceding the Industrial Revolution, in the 16th century 95% of the time there were wars involving the 
major European powers, 94% in the 17th and 78% in the 18th century; cf. Eloranta, 2005). For a broad 
picture of the frequency of warfare in state and non-state societies see Keeley, cit., pp. 32-33, and the 
literature quoted there. For the issue of population control in pre-industrial societies, with a survey of the 
relevant literature, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
108 The relation between population growth and agricultural technology was stressed by Boserup (1965), even 
if in Boserup’s work the causal relation was supposed to act in the contrary sense than the one implied 
above; the crucial element being the density of population affecting the length of fallows. However this 
could be really the case if a complete blueprint of alternative agricultural techniques were to exist at any 
given time, not if alternative agricultural techniques had to be discovered, or rediscovered, in a lengthy 
historical process. For a critical assessment of Boserup’s work, see Federico (2001). On the other hand 
Boserup’s argument could be reinterpreted as pointing towards endogenous technological progress in 
agriculture being stimulated by demographic conditions (see on this Cuffaro, 2001, pp. 67 f.).  
109 Easterlin, 1996, p. 1. 
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control, spreading from the more advanced countries to the lesser developed areas of the 
world, leading to a forecast of a peak of about 9.2 billion around the year 2050.110 
Table 7. Life expectancy at birth111 
 1820 1900 1950 2007 
Italy 30 43 66 79.9 
Western Europe 36 46 67 79.5 
Eastern Europe    74.5 
Russia 28 32 65 65.9 
United States 39 47 68 78 
Japan 34 44 61 82 
Latin America 27 35 51 72.8 
China na 24 41 72,9 
India 21 24 32 68.6 
Asia 23 24 40 69 
Africa 23 24 38 52,2 
World 26 31 49 65.8 
More developed countries    76.7 
Less developed countries    64.6 
Sources: Maddison, 2006, p. 32; for 2007 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at 
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbagg 
. 
What have been the causes of the post World War II world population explosion? 
Essentially the reduction in mortality rates and the increase in life expectancy (see tables 6 
and 7). The birth rate has on the whole decreased in the post-war period (see table 8), but 
the increase in life expectancy has been stronger: 17 years between 1950 to 1999 in the 
world as a whole, more or less the same as in the first half of the twentieth century, three 
times more than the increase of life expectancy in the crucial eighty years of the spread of 
the industrial revolution, from 1820 to 1900. One may also note that all the areas of the 
world have partaken in the great advance in life expectancy.112 Moreover, “differences in 
lifetime survival rates between rich and poor countries and between rich and poor 
individuals within countries were much higher two centuries ago than they are now”, and 
“over the past century, the life span gap between poor and rich countries has narrowed 
dramatically” (Milanovic et alii, 2007, p. 28 and p. 24). Yet, if one looks at more 
comprehensive data of vital statistics the differences between the different regions of the 
world is still staggering (see table 9).  It is interesting to note, in order to understand what 
has been accomplished in the course of the very short historical span of about two 
centuries, that the worst off in terms of life expectancy, the “Africans south of the Sahara 
survive a bit longer today … (even including the impact of AIDS), than did the English in 
                                                 
110 Cf. United Nations, 2008. 
111  The data concerning life expectancy in pre-modern and modern backward societies are affected by 
very high child mortality rates, while adult life expectancy can be much higher. For instance in a 
demographic regime such as in the Mopti district of Mali in 1957-58 with a total fertility rate (average 
number of live births per woman) of 7.5, life expectancy was 18, but life expectancy at 20 was 48, while in 
another instance, corresponding more or less to the demographic regime of 1650-1750 England, with 
fertility rate 4, life expectancy was 33, but life expectancy at 20 was 55 (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2003, p.  
210). 
112 Cf. tables 4A and 5A. 
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the early nineteenth century when they had the world’s longest life spans” (ibidem, p. 26). 
According to Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 741) the inequality in world life 
expectancy started to decrease from the beginning of the second quarter of the 20-th 
century, while the inequality in per capita income distribution continued to increase As to 
the population explosion in the post WWII period, one of the reasons lies in the impact of 
the Green Revolution in third world countries, such as Mexico and India, leading to a 
strong growth of agricultural production, adequate to feed a fast increasing world 
population.113 But also the improvements in transportation have contributed to avoid major 
demographic catastrophes due to starvation that would have negatively impacted on global 
population growth.114 
Table 8 Yearly births per 100 population115 
 1820 1900 1950 1999 2007 
Italy 3.9 3.3 1.94  0.93 0.85 
West European Average 3.74 3.08 1.83 1 1(EU) 
East European Average     0.99a) 
United States 5.52 3.23 2.4 1.44 1.42 
Japan 2.62 3.24 2.81 0.95 0.81 
Russia 4.13 4.8 2.65 0.88 1.09 
Latin American Average   4.19 2.51  
China  4.12 3.7 1.6 1.75 
India  4.58 4.5 2.8 2.27 
Asian Average (without Japan)   4.28 2.3  
African Average   4.92 3.9 3.8 
World   3.74 2.3 2.02 
Source: Maddison, p. 32 (some of the values refer to slightly different years: see the notes in the source); for the 
year 2007: CIA (2007), and, for the African average, PRB (2007). a) Simple average of 17 East-European 
countries, with values ranging from 8.8 (Bosnia) to 1.2 (Macedonia) 
 
                                                 
113 With the “Green Revolution” modern agricultural techniques and high productivity seeds were imported 
from the developed world into developing countries through organized efforts spurred first by the 
Rockefeller Foundation (starting from Mexico in 1944), to which the Ford Foundation later joined forces. 
The result was that “the adoption of High Yelding Varieties (HYVs) enormously increased the productivity 
of land and labor” (Federico, 2005, p. 214). For comprehensive statistical data on agricultural growth see 
ibidem, pp. 233 f. However in a number of areas, in particular in Africa, and Latin America, the methods of 
the Green Revolution have encountered fundamental organizational and environmental obstacles (on this 
see Cuffaro, 2001, chapters 5 and. 6, in particular pp. 117 f.). But taking into account the increasing 
integration of the world food market, productivity advances in some countries can have a favourable impact 
on the food balance of others through their effect on world prices, anyhow. 
114 The only globally relevant demographic catastrophe in the post War II period could have been a 
population deficit of an undetermined (and undeterminable) few tens of millions Chinese as a consequence 
of the famine following Mao’s Great Leap Forward: “a dip in the growth rate from 1959-1960… was due to 
the Great Leap Forward in China. During that time, both natural disasters and decreased agricultural output 
in the wake of massive social reorganization caused China's death rate to rise sharply and its fertility rate to 
fall by almost half” (US Census Bureau, 18/7/2007; the dip could be graphically seen in the sudden fall in 
the line of the population growth rate reported in the site of the World Population Clock). According to 
Yao (1999) the demographic deficit in the three years 1959-61 was somewhat higher than 49 million, of 
which about 18.5 million extra deaths and the rest lost births. Not a big difference anyway to the size of 
world population at the time, of about 3 billion. For other estimates one could refer to the literature quoted 
by Yao, in particular Peng Xizhe (1987). 
115  The data reported in the World Factbook for 2007 range from 0.73 (Hong-Kong) to 5.0. It is 
notable that among the 223 countries whose data are reported, 9 of the first 10 positions belong to African 
countries. 
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Table 9. Some vital statistics from WHO, year 2005116 
 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Adult 
mortality 
ratea) 
Under 5 
mortality 
rateb) 
Infant 
mortality 
ratec) 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rated) 
Maternal 
mortality 
ratee) 
           
Italy 78 84 71 75 89 46 4 4 3 5 
USA 75 80 67 71 137 81 8 7 4 14 
Japan 79 86 72 78 92 45 4 3 1 10 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
India 62 64 53 54 280 207 74 56 39 540 
Brazil 68 75 57 62 225 118 33 28 13 260 
China 71 74 63 65 155 98 27 23 18 56 
South-
East 
Asian 
Region 
62 65 54 55 272 207 68 51 35 460 
African 
Region 
48 50 40 42 480 438 165 99 40 910 
World 64 68 56 59 233 164 74 51 28 400 
European 
Union 
76 82      5   
Source: WHO, 2007; the last row from CIA (2007). For a definition of the different indicators and the methods 
used in their assessment, see WHO, National Burden of Disease Studies:A Practical Guide. Geneva; WHO, 2001. 
a)Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. b)Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live 
births. c)Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. d)Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days 
of life..e)Per 100,000 live births. 
7. Maddison’s statistical summing-up of world economic growth 
Even in the poorest of continents, Africa, per capita income has strongly increased 
(about three times; an unprecedented performance) since the spreading to the whole world 
of the present mode of production that followed the industrial revolution (see table 10). 
This has taken place notwithstanding the rapid population growth, which in the post World 
War II years has become the highest in the world (2.69% yearly in the period 1973-2001, 
somewhat reduced to 2,36% lately; cf. Table 5).   
According to Maddison’s statistical account (somewhat daring, owing to the length 
of the historical period covered), per capita income has declined in Western Europe during 
the first 1000 years of our era, from 450 PPP$ to 400 (where 400 stays for the physical 
subsistence level), reaching a nadir around 600 AD, and then starting a very slow 
recovery.117 In that period the rest of the world fared slightly better, per capita incomes 
being throughout the period somewhat higher in Africa (430 at 1AD, 425 at 1000AD), and 
                                                 
116 Some interesting extreme values (giving the existing range), from CIA Factbook (2007): Birth rate 
(births/1000) 50 (Niger)--7,34 (Hong-Kong); death rate (deaths/1000): 30.35 (Swaziland116)--2.16 (United 
Arab Emirates); Infant Mortality Rate: 184.84 (Angola)--2.3 (Singapore); Life Expectancy at Birth: 83.52 
(Andorra)--32.23 (Swaziland); Total Fertility Rate (children born/woman): 7.38 (Mali)---0.98 (Hong-Kong) 
(1.50 EU). 
117 The data for the year 1 in Western Europe and Asia are considered implausibly low by Federico (2002, p. 
115). Federico’s viewpoint  is consistent with Milanovic (December 2004) estimate of 840 (p. 22) or 
between 800 and 900 1990-PPP$ (p. 23) as the average per capita income of the Roman empire at the times 
of Augustus. 
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in Asia (450 in both years), while the remaining reions were still at low subsistence level 
(400). Five hundred years later the world as a whole had made some modest progress (from 
436 to 566). Italy was by far the richest country with 1100PPP$, but was stagnating until 
the Industrial Revolution (1820). The territories that were to become the Western 
Offshoots were the poorest at 400, Africa had somewhat declined at 414, stagnating until 
the colonial conquests of the nineteenth century, China had progressed from 450 to 600, 
staying at that level until 1820 and declining afterwards, down to 439 in 1950, Japan also 
progressed reaching 737 in 1820. At the threshold of the Industrial Revolution, in 1700, the 
richest world country were the Netherlands with 2130, Western Europe was somewhat 
lower than 1000PPP$ on average.118 
 
Table 10. World Per Capita GDP, Regional Averages, 1-2001 AD (1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)119 
 1  1000  1500  1600  1700  1820  1870  1913  1950  1973  2001  
Western Europe  450  400  771  890  998  1,204  1,960  3,458  4,579  11,416  19,256 
Eastern Europe  400  400  496  548  606  683  937  1,695  2,111  4,988  6,027  
Former USSR  400  400  499  552  610  688  943  1,488  2,841  6,059  4,626  
Western 
Offshoots 
400  400  400  400  476  1,202  2,419  5,233  9,268  16,179  26,943  
Latin America 400  400  416  438  527  692  681  1,481  2,506  4,504  5,811  
Japan  400  425  500  520  570  669  737  1,387  1,921  11,434  20,683  
Asia (excl. Japan)  450  450  572  575  571  577  550  658  634  1,226  3,256  
Africa  430  425  414  422  421  420  500  637  894  1,410  1,489  
World  445  436  566  595  615  667  875  1,525  2,111  4,091  6,049  
Source: Maddison, 2006, p. 642. 
 
Since 1870 economic growth has been accompanied, wherever data are available, by 
a great reduction, in many cases almost a halving of labour time (Maddison, 2006, p. 347). 
And hence by an enormous growth of hourly labour productivity (p. 351): notwithstanding 
the reduction in labour time, production per worker has greatly increased (about ten times 
since 1870 in Western Europe: Maddison, 2006, p. 349). Perusing the above data it 
becomes obvious that at the time Marx was writing Das Kapital no amount of redistribution 
could have ever brought about the dramatic improvement in the living standards of the 
masses that technical progress and development (“the development of productive forces”) 
would have brought about in less than a life-span. Thus Marx (1875) was right in 
downplaying the issue of distribution as such.120 Distribution may be important in the 
short-run for allowing some of the worse-off to improve their lot. In the long run for the 
                                                 
118 For the detailed country data one is referred to Maddison (2006, p. 639). 
119 For a definition of Geary-Khamis dollars cf. United Nations, 1992. It should be noted that taking Geary-
Khamis dollars enhances the reported incomes in poorer nations because goods and services consumed by 
them are calculated at the international prices that are closer to those of the richer countries where services 
are relatively more expensive, and thus understates the income inequality between nations. This depends on 
the Gerschenkron effect, whereby the national income of a nation is enhanced if calculated at the prices 
prevailing somewhere else, because in a country relatively more of the goods that are relatively cheaper are 
consumed. Cf. Dowrick and Akmal, 2005, Milanovic 2005b, p. 125.. 
120 As “it was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and put the principal stress on 
it.” 
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worse off it is more important the relation between distribution, technical improvements, 
production and accumulation 
 
Table 11 Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Regions, 0–1998 (annual average compound growth rate)  
 
0–
1000 
1000–
1500 
1500–
1600 
1600–
1700 
1700–
1820 
1820–
1998 
       
Western Europe –0.01 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 1.51 
Western Offshoots 0 0 0 0.17 0.78 1.75 
Japan 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 1.93 
Group A –0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18 1.67 
       
Latin America 0 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.19 1.22 
Eastern Europe & former 
USSR 
0 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.06 
Asia (excluding Japan) 0 0.05 0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.92 
Africa –0.00 –0.01 0 0 0.04 0.67 
Group B –0.00 0.04 0.02 0 0.03 0.95 
World –0.00 0.05 0.05 –0.00 0.05 1.21  
Source: Maddison (2006, pp. 30; 643) 
 
Table 12. Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Region, 1820-2001 (annual average compound growth rate) 
 1820–70 1870–1913 1913–50 1950–73 1973–2001 
Western Europe 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.88 
Eastern Europe 0.63 1.39 0.60 3.81 0.68 
Former USSR 0.63 1.06 1.76 3.35 -0.96 
Western Offshoots 1.41 1.81 1.56 2.45 1.84 
Japan 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14 
Latin America -0.03 1.82 1.43 2.58 1.84 
Asia (excluding Japan) -0.10 0.42 -0.10 2.91 3.55 
Africa 0.35 0.57 0.92 2 0.19 
 Source: Maddison (2006, p. 643) 
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8. The very long perspective of the world economic history according to 
the Malthusian viewpoint 
 
Fig. 2. The Malthusian trap (“world economic history in one picture” ), according to Gregory Clark121  
 
A possible interpretation of available historical evidence is the Malthusian view. Up 
to the dawn of the industrial revolution the great majority of humans were on the brink 
between physical survival and starvation. In a very long perspective there was by and large 
a Malthusian equilibrium between population and resources, with a very weak long run 
growth, amounting to near stagnation, of world population.122 Under such circumstances 
the distribution of income and wealth determines in the long run not the living standards 
of the masses but the size of the population: unequal distribution places in the hands of  
the privileged resources that could allow a larger population to subsist. At the same time 
the existence of privileged strata, which in the short run at least are somewhat out of the 
Malthusian trap, can affect the well being of the worst off through the externalities they 
generate. These could be negative (envy and the sense of relative deprivation) or positive 
(the hope, however slim, to be able to raise among the privileged, some identification with 
their interest and life experience, the possible cultural advantages that are mentioned 
below). Their relative impact may depend, among others, on the degree of mobility in the 
society concerned. Religion could surrogate mobility in this world with a belief in mobility 
in the afterworld. Even in the slave society of ancient Rome slaves could have some hope 
to be liberated, and even to become affluent or, in Christian times, to earn after death, alike 
their rich masters, and ever more than they, the Kingdom of Heaven. The existence of 
some strata able to enjoy a surplus over subsistence could have been an engine (however 
inefficient) of progress in living patterns, and an instrument for providing the resources for 
some to devote themselves to art, technology and science, with eventual long run benefits 
for average living standards, as well as cultural benefits for mankind.123 Moreover if a priori, 
                                                 
121 Fig. 1.1 in Clark (2007). 
122 Clark’s 2007 book is a recent representation of this viewpoint. 
123 Of course the propensity of the elite to dedicate itself to the pursuit of cultural advances, in particular in 
science and technology, very much depends on the prevailing societal values (which apparently in 
seventeenth to nineteenth century Britain were particularly favourable). In the modern world instead the 
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under the veil of ignorance, as in Rawls’ paradigm, one had to chose between two different 
possible societies where to live, one with a smaller population in Malthusian demographic 
equilibrium with inequalities, and another one with larger population in Malthusian 
demographic equilibrium with lower or absent inequalities, it is not quite clear that the 
choice would have been for the second alternative, given that to the first one, unlike the 
second, is associated some probability of finding oneself better off, once the veil of 
ignorance is dispelled, than in the egalitarian Malthusian subsistence alternative. Aside from 
nurturing a ruling elite, other surplus utilizations were for collective purposes, such as 
building cathedrals or waging wars, the latter possibly being in itself one of the principal 
instruments, through their disruptive consequences, as well as the directly inflicted deaths, 
of population control. The working of Malthusian limits could have affected economic 
progress negatively, pushing living standards down; however greater population density 
could have led to more advanced production techniques and modes of organization, in 
particular through the division of labour and increasing returns to scale.124 Moreover, even 
if the Malthusian trap had worked in the very long-run, in the shorter run there were long 
periods (such as after the Black Death) when population growth was compatible with some 
improvement in average living standards. Thus in the shorter run how wealth (land 
ownership in particular) was distributed would have made a great deal of difference for the 
well being of the bulk of the population. At the same time the pressure of population on 
resources could have been reduced by reducing the tendency to demographic growth, 
either by decreasing natality or by increasing mortality. Historically speaking the increase of 
mortality and reduction in life expectancy would first of all be based on infanticide, but also 
on high propensity to accidental death in later ages.  
8.1 The Malthusian mechanism under pre-agricultural conditions 
In particular looser or absent organized political power under pre-agricultural 
conditions could have made life more precarious and insecure, leading to higher adult 
mortality from violent deaths (which anyway would have been caused by such an 
hazardous endeavour as hunting with the available tools of the stone age), and consequent 
lower pressure on resources, thus allowing higher living adult standards than in later more 
densely populated agricultural societies.125 This could be a reason explaining the apparent 
paradox of the alleged lower living standards in agricultural in comparison to hunter-
gatherers societies.126 In the latter people appear on average to be better fed and enjoy 
much more leisure. This could be easily explained if we consider that in principle in hunter-
gathering nomadic societies to hunt and collect more does not help to prevent starvation in 
                                                                                                                                               
production of cultural goods and of scientific and technical knowledge does not require the existence of a 
privileged elite identified by birth. It is organized, as any other branch of production, with the employment 
of professional workers, whose position in society is affected by the embodiment of huge investments in 
human capital, turning them in their turn in an elite of some sort. It concerns in many cases the production 
of intrinsic public goods, thus with a strong participation by the state. Thus it is enormously speedier and 
more efficient than as a by-product of the very existence of elites in older times, and this provides an 
explanation for the much stronger recent economic growth. It is the product of the endeavour of the 
economically more advanced countries, but, owing to its intrinsic public good nature, all the world is able to 
benefit. 
124 In the development of agriculture this is stressed by Boserup (1965). 
125 For the propensity to violence and warfare of primitive societies and the consequent high death toll in 
proportional terms see Keeley (1996), pp. 28-29; 83-112. 
126 On this see Ember (1978); Diamond (1987); Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
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hard times, since what is above necessities cannot be hoarded. The bottleneck to survival 
could have been the occasional times of scarcity. In times of abundance there is no point in 
hunting and foraging more than what is needed for comfortable survival, taking into 
account the relation between possible yield and effort, where the former is reduced by the 
habit of sharing. At the same time, if less is hunted or foraged now, some more may be 
available in the future, especially if the foragers are able to reduce competition through 
defence of the territory against other groups. Another method to provide for the future as 
a kind of insurance (because of the expectation of reciprocating) is the practice of the 
sharing through gifts, probably enhanced by the fact that whenever a good hunt occurs the 
excess over current consumption cannot be stored, and what can be stored cannot be easily 
defended if it arises the envy of the lesser fortunate. In turn this in primitive societies may 
weaken the incentive to work,127 but at the same time can reduce the extent of the 
exploitation of natural resources, avoiding the “tragedy of the commons”. In agricultural 
societies it pays to labour all year along (even if with different intensity according to the 
seasons) in order to minimize the occurrence of starvation, since provisions can be carried 
on in time and improvements can durably increase the productive capabilities of the earth. 
So the harder and longer is labour the higher the probability of survival. In the end the 
numbers that a given territory can sustain are much higher with agriculture, but the living 
stiles are possibly less pleasant. A possible basic Malthusian mechanism for controlling 
hunter-gatherers populations can be the occurrence of the occasional lack of food bringing 
about starvation of a usually adequately fed population particularly subjected, because of 
the lack of carry-over, to the vagaries of environmental conditions.128 The greater the 
population density and the higher the pressure on resources, the higher the probability of 
occasional starvation to occur. In addition, a reason put forward for explaining the alleged 
better living standards of hunter-gatherers in relation to agriculturalists is the lower 
population pressure because of the more limited fertility of the former, associated with 
their specific mobile life style.129 During the Neolithic Demographic Transition, on the 
contrary, the apparent increase in fertility may be explained by the shift towards the 
sedentary life stile of agriculturalists from the previous nomadic pattern of hunters 
gatherers, and possibly by new opportunities for the earlier weaning of infants.130  
8.2 Hunter-gatherers and the Zen Economy  
According to an austere vision of the pre-agricultural societies, hunter-gatherers 
were in a Zen economy,131 where, even if people were living in absolute poverty according 
to our metric, they were quite well off according to another, assumed Zen-like metric, 
where the defining condition is the abundance of leisure and the satisfaction of limited 
wants. Interestingly, this corresponds to the condition of foraging animals in the wild (see 
Winterhalder, 1993); in both cases life can be endowed with leisure but at the same time 
rather short and precarious. Aside from the issue of absolute poverty, hunter-gatherers 
                                                 
127 Cf. Kaplan, 2000, p. 314. 
128 Cf. Kaplan, 2000, p. 311: “One of the perennial problems confronted by virtually all hunter-gatherers is 
not only the seasonal variation in resources, but more significantly the periodic failure of all major resources 
… Unlike agriculturalists, foragers appear to be unable or unwilling to store resources in the good times to 
tide them over the bad times.” 
129 Cf, Bocquet-Appel and Bahr-Yosef, 2008, p. 5. 
130 See Bocquet-Appel and Naji (2006). Of particular interest is the wide discussion of the whole issue, and of 
the specific findings of the authors, by other scholars at the end of the article.  
131 Sahlins, 1968, p. 85. 
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societies could have been on the whole relatively egalitarian, so that in terms of relative 
poverty they were rich. On the other hand not all the hunter-gatherers societies were 
egalitarian, for instance there were complex ones where a hierarchical organization and 
even slavery were present (see Fitzhugh, 2003).  
The myth of the "original affluent society” and of the extent of its leisure, as well as 
of its pretended favourable living conditions seemed very suitable for the 1968 cultural 
environment where it was conceived, a modern economic version of Rousseau “Noble 
Savage” utopia. In more recent times a more sober reappraisal has been put forward. 
Kaplan (2000), in considering the living standards of one of the surviving foraging 
populations (the !Kung San of Southern Africa), sees rather strange to qualify as affluent “a 
society with a 50 percent childhood mortality rate and a life expectancy at birth of about 
thirty years”. To this it may be added the particularly high death toll (in relative terms) as a 
consequence of warfare of primitive societies.132 Part of the confusion may derive from the 
apparent better alimentary and health conditions shown by the bones of pre-historical 
hunter-gatherers in relation to those of pre-historical agriculturalists.133 The inference of a 
worsening of material conditions (at least as far as alimentation is concerned) with the 
passage to agriculture are translated into the atemporal idea of the “original affluent 
society”, echoing the myth of an ancient blissful state of nature. 
9. The take off from the Malthusian Trap, the Industrial Revolution, 
Socialism and Transition 
Thus for almost the totality of human history poverty and starvation have been the 
rule, wealth and affluence a tiny exception in a sea of misery and precarious lives. 
Therefore the real historical singularity that must be explained is not poverty and 
backwardness, but development and wealth. If the issue of relative poverty and 
underdevelopment arises from the economic development of the countries that have 
become well off rather than from some countries having been made worse off in an 
absolute sense, it is to the development of poorer countries that one should turn for 
addressing  the issue, as well as for reducing, and one day perhaps eliminating, absolute 
poverty. In a number of countries, particularly in Asia, the take-off has succeeded, in 
others, particularly in Africa,  it seems to have failed. 
The gigantic increase of population and wealth in the last two centuries, and the 
very rapid (historically speaking) decrease in the proportion of the poor have been the 
outcome of a mode of production characterized by the systematic application of scientific 
principles, and the organized pursuit of scientific and technological progress, dramatically 
improving the living prospects of billions of men and women, as a consequence of the 
basic “idea of the world as open to transformation by human intervention.”134 Its ultimate 
sources may be found in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, tied together by the 
Reformation’s critical discussion of traditional received faith.135 The previous period of 
                                                 
132 See Keeley, 1996, pp. 88-94. 
133 Cf. for instance Cohen, 1991. 
134 Giddens and Pierson, 1998, p. 94. 
135The fundamental reasons of the “European miracle” and the precise moment of the European economic 
take-off from other advanced societies, such as in particular China, is a highly debated historical issue to 
which many huge tomes have been dedicated, since at least the issue was posed by Needham in the fifties. 
See for instance Jones (1981), Landes (1998), Pomeranz (2000). For a recent discussion of this issue, and a 
reference to the various viewpoints and bibliographical sources, see the thorough review article of Darwin 
(2008) by Adas (2009). Not all answers to the basic questions sound reasonable, in a number of instances 
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“Smithian” growth based on division of labour, increasing returns and trade could have 
provided the basic economic and institutional background.136  
Until the Soviet Revolution this mode of production took the organizational form 
and vehicle of transmission of the internal and international capitalist market. This does 
not detract anything from the role performed by the state, in particular as provider of 
public goods and infrastructure, but the basic principle of functioning of the economy has 
been voluntary exchange. It is on the system of voluntary exchange, and the creation and 
expansion of markets, as made possible by the creation of a mercantile economy and the 
gradual establishment of the rule of law and clear attribution and protection of property 
rights, that the success of the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath can be attributed. In 
this may lie the difference with other environments of the past (such as historical China or 
the Arab world at its apogee) where scientific progress and innovations did not translate 
into sustained economic and technological progress. Real socialism can be seen just as a 
specific variety of this mode of production whereby the fundamental aspects have been 
upheld through a sort of rough extension of the rational organizing principle to the whole 
of society, and accumulation and innovation have been organized from the centre rather 
than having been the outcome of the working of market forces. Eventually this daring 
experiment has encountered a bitter dead end, but in the process it has partaken both of 
the increase in population and of the increase in aggregate production. Its failure has been a 
comparative failure, but still its achievements in aggregate economic and vital statistical 
terms may be seen as substantial in relation to pre-industrial epochs. If we are willing to 
indulge a little bit in counterfactuals, suppose that real socialism had prevailed throughout 
the world by way of revolution and/or military conquest, destroying the international 
market system in the process. It is conceivable that after the initial disruptive consequences 
of the change of system some process of increasing world wealth and population would 
have persisted anyway, at very least by way of capital accumulation and technological 
diffusion in the lesser developed areas. Of course there is the issue as to the extent to 
which the survival of Soviet type socialism has been helped in practice by the 
contemporary existence of an international capitalist economy, from which to draw 
technology, as well as goods (such as foodstuffs) for whose production Soviet-type 
socialism was utterly disfunctional, and by an international price system easing the difficult 
task of evaluating economic opportunities.137 But let us abstract from the latter point. 
Would it have been enough to argue, after the suppression of capitalism, that no better 
                                                                                                                                               
reason, as often is the case, appear to become hostage to the desire to be original at all costs by presenting 
new alternative interpretations, however queer. In the text I am just hinting briefly to those explanations 
that seem more reasonable to me. 
136 The fundamental reasons of the “European miracle” and the precise moment of the European economic 
take-off from other relatively advanced societies, such as in particular China, is a highly debated historical 
issue to which many huge tomes have been dedicated, since at least the issue was posed by Needham in the 
fifties. See for instance Jones (1981), Landes (1998), Pomeranz (2000). For a recent discussion of this issue, 
and a reference to the various viewpoints and bibliographical sources, see Wagener, 2009, and the thorough 
review article of Darwin (2008) by Adas (2009) .  
137 Soviet-type socialism appears to have been much less proficient than capitalism in the production of 
consumer goods in general and in particular in the innovation of better consumer goods and better ways to 
satisfy consumer needs in particular. The only innovative consumer goods developed in the socialist camp 
that comes to my mind is Rubik’s cube, in Hungary in the mid seventies. However Soviet type socialism 
was by all accounts no inferior to western capitalism in the production and development of military 
hardware. It was much less efficient and much more profligate in its utilization of energy resources and raw 
materials (see on this Gomulka and Rostowski, 1988). 
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system than the socialist one is possible and to ascribe to the very nature of real socialism 
the economic and demographic progresses? In this respect two viewpoints seem to be 
equally objectionable: that a really existing, and therefore highly imperfect, system of 
production must be rejected because its performance is seen as defective, and another 
abstractly implementable system than the existing one (socialism vs. capitalism) should do 
necessarily better; as well the opposite contention that no better system of organization (in 
our counterfactual example capitalism vs. Soviet-type socialism) is possible.138 A further 
consideration refers to the heavy cost of transition, as borne out by the fall in per capita 
incomes, and, in the case of the former USSR, by the life statistical data.139 If compared 
with the case of China’s transition away from the Maoist system, this may exemplify the 
heavy toll of revolution as compared to evolution. Indeed transition in the former socialist 
camp has amounted to a, by and large pacific, but on the whole very disruptive, revolution 
led by institutional constructivism, the idea that everything can be explained by legal 
institutions, irrespective of the social and historical environment where these institutions 
are nested. One may also think in this respect of a second best theorem (as a consequence 
of institutional complementarity): whenever institutions from a superior environment (in 
the sense that on its whole it brings about superior results) are introduced in an 
environment where the complementary institutions (which may well be of a tacit nature) 
are missing this can actually lead to a worsening, rather than to a betterment, of 
performance, until the complementary institutions are introduced, or a suitable adaptation 
of the overall institutional framework has taken place. Of course the issue of the best 
strategy of transition is a complex and most debated one. A crucial factor constraining 
transition strategies was of course the fact that the economic and political system in the 
European ex-communist countries was rotten from the inside, and its credibility and social 
support was low, rendering a path of gradual economic reform difficult to follow. 
10. Post-war  development and the Malthusian trap 
As we have seen, a most remarkable fact is that world population and wealth have 
never grown so fast as in the post World War II period.140 We have considered the possible 
causes: globalization (in particular the great intensification of international trade and 
investment), technical progress (and the progress of medicine), originating in the European 
countries and Anglo-European offshoots; and the absence of devastating conflicts at the 
global level (the world has been on the brink of a nuclear global disaster, but it has not 
fallen into the precipice, yet). The progresses in transportation and agriculture have been of 
particular importance for the provision of the basic means of survival; thanks to those 
progresses Woodruff’s speculation in the sixties that “if we are to be guided simply by 
statistics, then in AD 2000—i. e. in the lifetime of our children—world population will 
have doubled and misery and starvation will stare mankind in the face” (Woodruff, 
1982[1966], p. 340) turned out to be correct only as far as the doubling of world population 
was concerned. 141 
                                                 
138 Following Demsetz (1969) the first of the two views is dubbed as Nirvana fallacy. 
139 In particular higher mortality rates and decreasing life expectancy, in particular of males. 
140 This is epitomized by the title of Easterlin 1996 book: Growth Triumphant. 
141 For the remarkable performance of world agriculture in modern times, but especially in the post second 
world war years, when agricultural output growth was exceeding the most exceptional growth of 
population, see Federico (2005, p. 19). For the role of agriculture spearheading, alongside industry, modern 
economic growth, see Easterlin, 1996, p.5. 
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Notwithstanding the above successes, for the world as a whole the Malthusian trap 
is still lurking.142 But rather than decreasing agricultural returns, as in the classical 
explanation, it may here be relevant the pressure on scarce natural resources,143 and in 
particular the threat against development and living standards of the possible “tragedies of 
the commons”, including climate change consequence of increased production and 
population.144 The industrial and demographic developments that have accompanied the 
present relative prosperity have taken place at the cost of world’s commons, in particular at 
the cost of the decumulation in the span of two hundred years of huge reserves of fossil 
fuels, the leftovers of hundreds of millions of years of life on earth.145 To this one may add 
the destruction of forests and pristine habitats, the pollution of air and water, and, last but 
not least, CO2 emissions. The plunder has mostly taken place to the advantage of 
industrialized countries, and of countries provided with large reserves of raw materials (in 
particular hydrocarbons), appropriating the rents of their exploitation. On the other hand 
the overall balance for poorer and energy poor countries cannot be considered as negative, 
since in the process their average living standards (considering both per capita income and 
vital statistics) have greatly improved all the same, as a consequence of the diffusion of the 
technological advances of the West. But as more and more countries successfully pursue 
the type of industrialization and economic development that has made the West rich and 
better off the emerging economies, the pressure on world resources and the enhanced 
generation of obnoxious externalities may exert a negative feedback elsewhere, especially 
on the living standards of the countries deprived of natural resources, with potential 
destabilizing consequences on the economy and the peace of the world. 
Extrapolating historical experience, the way out the Malthusian trap could lie on the 
one hand in the enhancing of technological progress, and on the other in population 
containment, lessening the pressure on the resource base (including the world commons). 
Population containment could be the outcome of a voluntary process, either at the 
individual and family level, following the demographic pattern of reduction of natality 
accompanying the development of the presently more developed countries, or it may be 
favoured by public policy; the possible alternatives are the usual ones that have constrained 
the development of population in history. Once demographic developments are considered 
an object of policy, some delicate philosophical problems present themselves: Is it better in 
presence of limited resources to have many overlapping generations with short lives, or 
fewer generations with longer lives? How short or how long, and how many generations? 
How many  people for each generation? Many people with low living standards, or few 
                                                 
142 The extent to which the Malthusian trap is lurking is however controversial. For an optimistic viewpoint 
see Simon (1981). According to Simon “another birth means another mind that can help think up ways of 
using resources more efficiently” (Lee, 2008). On the opposite side there is a vast intellectual current 
renewing the Malthusian tradition, such as by Garret Hardin, Albert A.Bartlett,  Paul Ehrlich, and the Club 
of Rome. 
143 Downplayed by Simon (1989), who optimistically sees in technological progress favoured by an increasing 
population the overall dominant factor. 
144 According to a plausible view, very specialized life stiles, such as in the contemporary world, increase 
population vulnerability to dramatic environmental changes; see Chu, 1998, pp. 193-194. 
145 In this perspective the long run survival and spreading to the rest of humanity of the high living standards 
of the most developed world crucially depend on the successful untapping of relatively clean and plentiful 
new sources of energy, such as nuclear energy, either in the development of its fission or even more, 
perhaps, in its elusive fusion form. 
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with higher living standards? And how low or how high?146 In this respect one should be 
reminded of the old saying “more souls more joy”. Ceteris paribus, the larger the 
population the greater the number of possible originators of new ideas and discoveries, 
from which the progress of humanity (however conceived) ensues, and the greater the 
number of possible contacts and personal interactions, favouring the development of 
ideas.147 At the same time there may be some trade-off between quantity and quality: a 
smaller better educated population could be more conducive to economic and intellectual 
progress than a larger uneducated one living at the margin of survival. Theoretically 
speaking we could also have a dynamic equilibrium à la Jules Simon, whereby high 
population growth spurs fast technological progress, the latter higher per capita incomes, 
which would retroact in maintaining the momentum of technical progress and of 
demographic and economic growth, compensating Malthusian static decreasing returns.148 
11 The limits to population growth: natality, mortality, and catastrophes 
 
It is obvious however that a demographic explosion such as that of the last decades 
cannot last forever. Carlo Cipolla (1974 [1962], p. 86) quotes “an exercise in astronomical 
arithmetics” by C.P. Putnam (the inventor of the world's first megawatt-size wind turbine, 
installed in 1941)149, according to which “if the [human] race had sprung from a couple 
living not long before agriculture was discovered—let us say 10,000 B.C.—and if its 
members had expanded at the rate of one per cent per year since then [which is lower than 
the present rate of growth of world population], the world population would form today a 
sphere of living flesh many thousand light years in diameter, and expanding with a radial 
velocity that, neglecting relativity, would be many times faster than light.”150 
A correction to the  demographic process leading to world overpopulation (where 
obviously the concept of overpopulation is a hazy one and partly depends on values) could 
be found in a decreasing birth rate, as a by-product of per capita income growth, and in the 
extension of social security systems in the countries where the survival of the elderly is still 
dependent on family ties, as well as in the improvement and diffusion of the technology of 
birth control. Thus, according to Easterlin (1996), p. 112, “both theory and evidence 
indicate that the population explosion is a transient phase of contemporary development 
experience”, since in developing countries “the more rapid the Mortality Revolution, the 
more rapid is the transition to lower fertility”, replicating, albeit with different speed and 
modalities, the demographic transition of present developed countries. But can one really 
discount the possibility that the Mortality Revolution could intensify as a consequence of 
further medical discoveries after the transition to lower fertility is over, or that preferences 
                                                 
146 These dilemmas can be seen as brought to their extreme consequences in Asimov’s utopian world of the 
Foundation series (cf. in particular Asimov, 1986): As an alternative model to the crammed world of Trantor, 
the capital of the Galactic Empire, where 40 billion humans live in artificial domes, we have the very 
sparsely populated Solaria, where the population is controlled by strict demographic planning, with few 
(mutated) humans living very comfortably in very large estates worked by armies of robots. 
147 Cf. Simon (1981). 
148 On the relation between population growth, technical progress, and per capita incomes see Kremer (1993). 
149 Cf. Wikipedia’s entry “Smith-Putnam wind turbine” and the sources there provided. 
150 A more elementary calculation (2 multiplied by 1.01 elevated by 12000) would turn out an astronomical 
number of humans (1.4 multiplied by 1052). Their annual increment would be a number with only two digits 
less. As argued by Albert A. Bartlett “the greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to 
understand the exponential function” (cf. http://www.albartlett.org/) and thus, in particular, the physical 
impossibilily of exponential population growth in the very long-run..  
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regarding procreation could differ as a consequence of different cultural traditions in 
developing countries, and that preferences could change even in the developed world, 
altering the dynamic demographic balance? Indeed, there are signs that this may the case 
and that the long-run relationship between development fertility could be in reality j-
shaped.151 Neither preferences nor technology can really be considered as given in the long-
run. The forecast of a levelling out of world population around 2050 at something more 
than 9 billion is at most a reasonable extrapolation of present trends, but of course only 
those who will be there at the time will be able to judge whether it is an adequate prediction 
of the future. 
The shape of a future long-run population equilibrium, absent a sudden 
demographic catastrophe, could entail a low mortality rate, a low birth rate, a long life span, 
and a marked increase in the average population age. Perhaps a senescent population will 
be less dynamic but wiser, and more endowed with experience.152 While we can think of 
demographic policies affecting the size of a population at the country level (even if a 
country could represent an important chunk of the world population, such as China), it 
seems hardly possible that demographic policies could be devised and implemented on the 
world level (such as advocated notably by Julian Huxley153) in order to take into account 
the important externalities that individual decisions regarding procreation have for the 
world as a whole.154 In the past demographic control, contrasting the operation of the 
Malthusian trap, was often ensured by custom, involving habits such as organized celibacy 
(as in monastic orders), repression of sexuality, and late marriages (the way out praised by 
Malthus himself), systematic infanticide, or belligerent habits leading to an increase of adult 
mortality.155 Under conditions of progressively increasing life expectancy demographic 
control could assume the form of some limitation to the length of life, if not explicitly and 
legally binding as in the dystopian world of the 10-th Victim,156 in the more subtle form of 
denying life supporting medical treatment and, possibly, the economic means of survival, to 
the elderly. 
11.1 The three horsemen of the Malthusian apocalypse 
Of the three factors that have historically contributed to hold populations in check 
through recurrent catastrophes: epidemics, famines, and war, the impact of epidemic 
                                                 
151 Cf. Myrskylä et alii, 2009. 
152 On the quality advantages of a more aged labour force see Easterlin, 1996, p. 124. For the economic 
consequences of population aging see ibidem, pp. 113, f. 
153 Cf. Julian Huxley (1964). Huxley is rather vague however on the instruments. Apparently the main 
instrument of population control that he envisages is the diffusion and promotion of the technology of 
birth control (p. 248: “When I say a population policy, I don’t mean that anybody is going to tell how many 
children she may have… It means that you recognize population as major problem of national life, that you 
have a general aim in regard to it, and that you try to devise methods for realizing this aim. And if you have 
an international population policy, again it doesn’t mean dictating to backward countries or anything of that 
sort; it means not depriving them of the right … to scientific information on birth-control, and it means 
help in regulating and controlling their increase and planning their families.”) Fictionally, there is far-
reaching demographic planning in Julian’s brother’s Aldous Huxley dystopian novel Brave New World (1932). 
154 A rather provocative and thought provoking discussion of the externalities generated by individual 
population decisions and the (un)suitability of a deliberate public policy aimed at affecting them is Friedman 
(1972). 
155 For an account of various methods of population control in different historical and anthropological 
settings, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
156 Petri (1965). 
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diseases has been greatly reduced by the progresses of medicine and hygiene. Of course the 
possibility of the surfacing of some new epidemic disease, such as aviary influenza, is 
always possible, but only with temporarily limited consequences, until, presumably, medical 
research comes to grip with it. Mass starvation as a consequence of famine has been largely 
overcome by progresses in transportation and agricultural technique, with the possible 
exception of countries plagued by war and heavy internal conflicts. Even if at the moment 
tensions are re-surfacing on the international food market, following increased demand and 
the ill-advised subsidization of fuel producing crops, another agricultural revolution is in 
progress through the development of GMOs, which, notwithstanding misgivings and 
preconceived hostilities, seems essentially a foregone development. The impact of the new 
agrarian revolution appears more far-reaching and of potentially much greater impact than 
the previous one, because of the much faster process of scientific plant breeding, and the 
much greater potential of invention of new varieties suitable for the most varied 
environmental conditions.157 However, like the Green Revolution, and even more than the 
latter, the GMOs revolution also presents problems of compatibility with the various 
natural and institutional environments, especially in less developed countries. Obstacles to 
its spreading are presented by the specific nature of its associated private property rights, 
and consequent hindrances to imitation of privately owned know-how.158 The latter aspect 
could be partly overcome through internationally concerted public action, involving in 
particular public, instead of private, funding of research. Moreover public international 
funding could provide an opportunity to direct research in areas which, while privately 
unprofitable, may contribute to stave off humanitarian crises, and help development, of 
poorer countries subject to environmental degradation. All in all the potentially most 
destructive factor, besides some sudden environmental disaster, could eventually be war, as 
a consequence of the spreading of atomic technology and of international tensions building 
up in an increasingly overcrowded and progressively shrinking world.159  
12. War, peace, the Bomb, and their economic consequences 
12.1 The economic consequences of war and peace in historical perspective 
Relative peace, maintained by the nuclear balance of terror, is seen as a crucial 
factor for explaining Post-War II economic achievements. “Capitalist peace” whereby 
countries interact though mutually advantageous voluntary exchanges excluding wars of 
territorial aggrandizement, which were endemic in the not-distant past, is another. 160 Seen 
from the perspective of recent achievements, the game humanity played in the past, when 
conquest, plunder, territorial expansion and domination, slavery, torture and mass killings 
were respectable endeavours and part of the rules of the game, and mass murderers 
acquired the status of national heroes, still remembered and glorified in monuments and 
                                                 
157 See Cuffaro, 2001, p. 139 
158 Ibidem, pp. 136-144. 
159 It is well known that overcrowding is a factor of aggressiveness in animal populations. Some tendencies of 
this sort could apply to human populations as well, especially if overcrowding leads to tension building 
processes such as massive migration flows and increasing pressure on natural resources. That demographic 
growth could lead to international tensions and open conflicts for getting control of natural resources is 
denied by Simon (1989). His arguments, pointing to induced technical progress especially in agriculture, are 
not really persuasive though, because he is simply assuming, extrapolating the past, the offsetting impact of 
induced technical progress in the future. 
160 On capitalist peace see Weede (1999), Gartzke (2005, 2007). 
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history books, has led on the whole to very poor results, as measured at least in terms of 
demographic and economic growth. However the real extent to which wars were 
contributing to hold in check the progress of humanity is difficult to gauge. 161 A strict 
Malthusian could object that living standards and population would have been held in 
check by other Malthusian factors anyway. On the other hand as an instrument of 
population control war was particularly wasteful. It produced destruction of capital, both 
physical and human (in particular the loss of adult males in their productive prime, whereas 
mortality from disease or starvation affected first of all the children and the elderly). It 
required huge resources that could be alternatively used for collective surplus creation 
(which could be employed for productivity enhancement: for instance irrigation works) or 
for demographic enlargement. The latter could lead to economic progress, in a Boserupian 
perspective, or through the cultural mechanisms argued by Julian Simon. Personal trade 
interrelations and useful personal contacts between the belligerents are disrupted by war, 
with negative consequences on the economic base, and demographic sustainability, of the 
parties concerned. According to the social-Darwinist vision, war is seen historically as an 
engine of natural selection of peoples and civilizations towards the progress of humanity.162 
But the selection provided by war has tended to bring to the fore populations and 
civilizations notable for their destructive and coercive power rather than for their peaceful 
civilized achievements. At the same time peaceful achievements could be to some extent 
dependent on the ability to organize and exert some degree of coercive power: a relatively 
complex societal organization, such as some ancient or modern empires, could be apt both 
to successfully wage wars and to peaceful and progressive purposes, as relative to the times. 
But this does not apply, for instance, to the fierce primitive hordes plundering and 
destroying ancient civilizations and complexly organized states. Here too the picture could 
change, once the hordes are settled and organize an empire on a territory that may profit of 
the relative stability provided by the rulers (such as in the case of the Pax Mongolica), at 
least until the next run of invasions, massacres and destruction, in an endless Penelopian 
weaving and destroying the thread of civilization.  
Whatever the reasons, until recent times the progress of humanity, both in terms of 
population and of productive achievements, has been so slow as to amount, in our present 
perception of time, to stagnation, with long spans of regression.163 The first millennium of 
the vulgar era was for Europe, from the economic viewpoint, a lost millennium: the 
decadence and fall of the Roman Empire and the dislocations following the barbaric 
invasions left Europe worse off in the year 1000, at the dawn of the new Christian nations, 
than at the time of the birth of Jesus Christ. Real sustained progress, meaning a substantial 
overcoming of the Malthusian trap (or anyway, whatever the interpretation, of the near 
long run stagnation, according to our modern perspective, in world population and per 
capita incomes), had to wait until the Industrial Revolution gradually spread all over the 
                                                 
161 For a quantitative assessment of the negative impact of war on growth in modern times, see Milanovic 
(2005a).  
162 Cf. Mueller, 2009, p. 7. 
163 An exception could have occurred during the Neolithic Demographic Transition when, according to 
some, population growth rates of 1% and more could have taken place for a sustained span of time (see 
Gary Warrick’s comment in Bocquet-Appel and Najit, 2006, p. 355; Bellwood, Peter and Marc Oxenham, 
2008, p. 22). With no improvement of living standards, however: as we have already mentioned the 
common opinion is that actually living standard were lower than under the previous pre-agricultural 
societies, because of longer work hours, less satisfactory nutrition, greater morbidity as a consequence of 
higher population density. 
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world. But it has been the peace period after the Second World War (localized conflicts 
notwithstanding) that has been accompanied by the greatest acceleration in the speed of 
demographic and economic advance the world has ever known in its history.  
12.2 The illegality of war 
Following the tragedy of two world wars the international community refuses the 
legitimacy of wars of aggression directed to the enlargement of national borders and the 
acquisition of new territories, which in the past were one of the most popular endeavours 
of nations and rulers and, if successful, were a source of glory and pride. In the post-war 
period, in comparison with previous times, expansionary wars have been on the whole very 
limited, and almost always restricted to less developed countries. In most cases they have 
been unsuccessful, a moderating factor having been the pressure exerted by the 
international community.164 It is not particularly tranquillizing however that the watchdog 
against wars of aggressions, empowered by the art. 39 of the Charter of the United Nations 
is a Security Council populated by revisionist powers, as well as powers that have been 
ready to spread through warlike means their political system (democracy);165 nor that the 
provision of art 39 had a precedent in article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
but this, as well as the Kellog-Briand pact of 1928 outlawing wars of aggression, did not 
prevent Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (both signatories of the pact) attacking 
Poland in September 1939, thus triggering the Second World War. 
12.1.1 On the economic rationality of war 
In the past the natural productive foundations on which to re-start a growth 
process were largely unaffected by catastrophic events, as the foundation of wealth and 
survival was agriculture. Thus a war of conquest had some rationality).166 (as in the present 
world it may appear a war for controlling territories endowed with natural resources, such 
as hydrocarbons, or having a strategic location for their transport and control). This 
corresponds to the German Lebensraum concept, which however came to prominence in a 
period when agriculture had greatly reduced its relative importance in favour of industry, 
but which also encompassed the advantageous procurement through territorial expansion, 
in the mindset of the autarchic economy, of primary resources useful for industrial and 
military purposes. Under autarchy, territorial expansion could also be seen as a means of 
market expansion, a costly replacement for free international trade. In older times plunder 
and enslavement of the conquered could provide further reasonable motivations (obviously 
looking just at the economic viewpoint), and this historical experience was again not alien 
to Nazi warlike ideology and programmes. People and land were considered the 
                                                 
164 Cf. Zacher (2001). For a detailed list of post-War II military events and of their territorial consequences 
see the table 2, “Interstate territorial aggressions, 1946–2000” (ibidem, pp. 225-228). 
165 Present revisionist powers are obviously Russia (willing to reassert its control of the former Soviet space, 
and de facto annexing after an act of war Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which theoretically were part of an 
independent Georgia), and China, keen to annex, possibly even by force of conquest, Taiwan, a de facto 
independent country, of which territory China lost control in 1895. The willingness of USA and UK to 
spread democracy by force on Iraq found some kind of justification in the intrinsic expansionistic nature of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime and, possibly, in the conviction (on which we shall return later on) that 
democracies have a greater tendency to be on peace with their neighbours, so it would be to world peace 
lasting advantage to impose them by war. Even aside from the rather doubtful (and possibly foolhardy) 
endeavour of imposing democracy on countries with no democratic tradition, exporting democracy as well 
as preventing presumed future acts of aggression by force are illegal acts under the present rules of 
international law. 
166 On this point see Simon (1989, pp. 170-171).  
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foundations of the power and prosperity of states, of the capability to defend (and to 
enlarge) themselves and enhance the potentialities of surplus extraction.167 Things appear 
differently with the drastic change in the economic basis out of agriculture, and the 
advances, and increased destructive power, of military technology. The prosperity of 
industrial and post-industrial countries relies on very delicate social and economic 
mechanisms, and a much greater surplus may be enjoyed through voluntary exchange than 
through conquest and enslavement (even disregarding their costs). This was the argument 
raised by Angell (1913) on the eve of the First World War, declaring its impossibility on 
rational economic considerations: “It is impossible for one nation to seize by force the 
wealth or trade of another -- to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on 
another” (Angell, 1913, p. ix; along the same lines one may refer to Simon, 1989; and 
Gilpin, 1981, pp. 132-133: “through specialisation and international trade an efficient state 
can gain more than through territorial expansion and conquests”). A recent contrary view is 
presented by Liberman, 1996. Liberman, drawing on a survey of historical cases, argues 
that “ruthless invaders can, in fact, successfully exploit industrial societies, as least for short 
periods of time.” But “the balance sheets evalutated [in his book] do not consider the costs 
of military conquest or economic sanctions imposed by states outside the empire…Mainly 
because other states balance against aggressors, conquest usually leads to disaster”(p. 4). 
Moreover successful exploitation requires ruthless coercion and repression (p. 5). On 
balance, it seems quite likely that the economic benefit of free trade may be highly superior 
to the economic benefits of successful military conquest, even if the latter is accompanied 
by ruthless exploitation (in this may lie the often assumed tendency of free trade to lead to 
peace, while the latter instead could be jeopardized by trade barriers, which could give 
some justification to the merging of market through imperial conquest; see on this 
Liberman, 1996, p. 30, and the literature quoted there). But this is particularly true of our 
modern times when technological progress is particularly fast and the modern fabric of 
society particularly complex. One thing is to exert outside repressive control over mass 
production in large factories organized along tayloristic principles (such as it may have been 
in the historical cases considered by Liberman) under unchanging or slowly changing 
technology, another in the framework of modern post-industrial economies based on 
information technology and on sophisticated management of production and innovation, 
where about three quarters of National Income rely on the production of services in a 
context of rapid technological progress. The latter could be greatly hampered anyway by 
the kind of exploitative organization that Liberman is considering. It should be noted that 
the Liberman’s argument in support of the historical profitability of conquest is ambiguous. 
It refers rather to the “cumulativity” of the resources of the conquered to be used for the 
military power of the conquerors rather than for the economic welfare of the latter. 
Conquest, according to Liberman, could enhance military power through exploitation of 
the resources of the conquered by the conqueror government towards warlike endeavours 
favoured by making those resources available to the state. But trade may instead increase 
economic welfare, without its benefits being amenable to centralized control, especially if 
the opportunity for trade could be progressively enhanced by technological progress and 
increased productivity, while economic development, and so the growth of potential 
surplus, could be hampered by exploitative dominance. Thus exploitative dominance could 
have some attractive for authoritarian states, much less for democracies. This can be seen 
                                                 
167 On this see Gilpin pp. 111-112. 170.  
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as a motive in favour of the idea that democracies are less conflict prone than other 
regimes. As far as internal conflicts are concerned the ballot seems a more peaceful method 
of government change than alternative non peaceful methods (such as revolutions, 
assassinations, or military coups). However the lower propensity of democracies to wage 
external wars has been recently challenged. According to Gartzke (2005, 2007), who 
elaborates and empirically tests Angell’s argument,168 it is the international capitalist market, 
rather than democracy, that works contrary to conflict in “capitalist peace”. On the other 
hand between advanced democracies and prosperous market economies embedded in the 
international economy there is an obvious overlap.169 
12.1.2 The economic irrationality of war  
Eventually, the war that Angell decreed as rationally impossible broke out, with 
catastrophic economic (not to speak of the non-economic) consequences for everybody 
concerned, putting a halt to the successful economic progress of the “belle époque”. War is 
indeed an eminently destructive endeavour, and often independent of rational economic 
considerations. And rational economic considerations may not be really important in 
waging a war: “In sum, studies of both the direct and the indirect influence of economic 
factors on the causation of war indicate that they have been much less important than 
political ambitions, ideological convictions, technological change, legal claims, irrational 
psychological complexes, ignorance, and unwillingness to maintain conditions of peace in a 
changing world”170. Moreover “not the facts, but men’s belief about facts, shapes their 
conduct”.171 Once Keynes wrote that practical men are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economists.172 We could extend the concept to international politics and war: men (and 
women) can turn out to be captive of the ideas and the examples, recounted and celebrated 
by historians, of ancient conquerors and warlike peoples, notwithstanding the change in the 
economic and political circumstances that should rationally lead to different modes of 
behaviour. Far from acting as magistra vitae history, especially doctored history, may become 
a time-bomb, to be handled with the utmost care. This may be seen to apply to the case of 
the wars of Yugoslav succession rekindling historical myths of ancient warlike prowess and 
incompatible territorial expansions, founded on past historical experience, compressed and 
actualized to the present times or, more recently, to the renewed imperial ambitions of 
Putin’s post-Soviet Russia. But history presents innumerable cases where the conscience of 
the heritage of the past brought about present blunders and destruction. A textbook case, 
not too far away in time, is the Italian Fascists’ grotesque striving to revive the past glories 
of the Roman empire.  
12.2 The economic consequences of the Bomb173 
The economic argument against war becomes much more compelling with nuclear 
technology. The spreading of nuclear armaments brings about a reduction in the propensity 
                                                 
168 As mentioned by Gartzke (2007, p. 170) a tendency for trade and free commerce to favour peace and be 
an obstacle to war was already identified by a number of previous authors, such as Montesquieu, Paine, 
Smith, Cobden and John Stuart Mill. For the concept of “capitalist peace” see Weede, 1999, pp. 66 f- 
169 Gartzke (2007, p. 182). 
170 Wright (1968, p. 463), quoted in Simon (1989, p. 5). 
171 Angell, 1913, p. ix. 
172 “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their 
frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back” (Keynes, 1936, p. 383).  
173 For a survey of the debate on the consequences of the Bomb for international relations see Roth, 2007. 
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towards armed regional conflicts. After India and Pakistan had acquired nuclear status 
there have been moments of acute tension, but, unlike the past, none of these tensions has 
led to open war, but for the localized Kargil conflict on the Indian side of the Kashmir line 
of control in 1999, where the possession of nuclear weapons may have contributed to keep 
the conflict localized and to lead eventually to the withdraw of Pakistani forces.174 Since it 
has become a nuclear power, Arab countries have ceased to wage open war to Israel, with 
the exception of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the Israel presumed atomic capability 
may have weighted heavily on the extent of American support for Israel,175 and on the 
restricted aims of the Syrian-Egyptian offensive.176 Open direct conflicts between nuclear 
powers have been very rare and localized, such as the Kargil conflict mentioned above, and 
the Soviet-Chinese Ussuri conflict in 1969. At the same time, in case of escalation of 
hostilities towards a global conflict between atomic powers, the consequences could be 
disastrous, and not only for the countries concerned. The nuclear deterrent could be used, 
instead than for maintaining a cold peace, as a safeguard against escalating a conventional 
conflict in a nuclear war. But waging a conventional war against another nuclear power 
under the deterrence of a nuclear umbrella, being confident that it will not escalate in a 
nuclear conflict could be a very dangerous game.  
In the present world the victory in a nuclear war could be a Pyrrhic one, since the 
conquered territories would stay contaminated and unproductive, 177 and the wealth of the 
defeated would be destroyed with their physical destruction, not to speak of the losses of 
the victor. Until now this entirely rational consideration (as well as the fear for the 
enormous losses of a nuclear war) has prevented all out wars between nuclear powers. But 
some kind of miscalculation as to the opponent’s response could precipitate a nuclear 
conflict. And unfortunately hate, which may be totally destructive, can provide a stronger 
motivation than greed. Indeed, the object of hate is in damaging or destroying the other, 
while greed amounts to benefiting oneself irrespective of the welfare of the others, but it 
does not necessarily imply their destruction. Sometimes it may even imply caring for their 
welfare, if their survival or collaboration is to the advantage of the greedy. In this respect 
we can add hate to the perspective of Simon (1989, p. 179), according to whom “Ironically, 
all haters of war should pray that humans are very materialistic in their motives, as 
compared to their devotion to their religious or cultural heritage, or even to aesthetic 
values, because sound calculation of the economic benefit-cost ratio of war would result in 
the decision not to begin a war.” Historically, intrinsic favourable attitudes towards war and 
against peace as such were also widespread, based on war being the occasion for displaying 
moral virtues and for performing heroic deeds, authoritatively represented, among others, 
in the works of prominent philosophers, from Aristotle to Kant (before writing Zum Ewigen 
Frieden), to Nietzsche (see Mueller, 2009, p. 2). In a sense war was in the past pre-atomic 
                                                 
174 CSIS, 1999. 
175 Cf. Farr, 1999, and the literature quoted by him. 
176 “Arab strategies and war aims in 1967 may have been restricted because of a fear of the Israeli ‘bomb in 
the basement,’ the undeclared nuclear option. The Egyptians planned to capture an eastern strip next to the 
Suez Canal and then hold. The Syrians did not aggressively commit more forces to battle or attempt to 
drive through the 1948 Jordan River border to the Israeli center. Both countries seemed not to violate Israel 
proper and avoided triggering one of the unstated Israeli reasons to employ nuclear weapons” (Ibidem). 
Even if the possession by Israel of a viable battle-ready nuclear capability was uncertain (see Roth, 2007, p. 
379), the mere possibility could have been enough to restrict the scope of the attack, even if not the attack 
itself. 
177 But the above does not apply to the neutron bomb! 
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world the most preferred sport for engaging the physical contest of communities and 
nations, before the invention and world diffusion of football.  
12.3 The balance of power and the poison pills of the weak 
The return to the old days when the balance of power was ensuring a precarious 
equilibrium between “conservative” and “revisionist” powers entails enormous dangers: an 
international equilibrium based on the balance of power, rather than on basic commonly 
shared values (such as in the “pluralistic security community” of the West to which Russia 
could have become part if not for the drive towards authoritarian nationalism, or, in its 
words, “sovereign democracy”), may lead to war whenever the balance is altered, or is seen 
in the process of being altered.178 Moreover, the future may bring about the impossibility of 
having a balance of military power because of the net economic and military dominance of 
some large and assertive, potentially “revisionist”, and expansionist, actors, such as could 
be the case in future with China179. Poison pills by weaker powers, such as the potential of 
derailing a conventional war into a nuclear war, with terrible consequences for the stronger 
aggressor, even in case the weaker is defeated (what it may be called the “Samson 
strategy”), could in the future restrain military aggression, albeit not some kind of suicidal 
attacks by those motivated by hate and unrestrained by the prospects of their own 
destruction. But also stronger powers could be tricked in gambling from their position of 
strength, and their delusion could bring about untold consequences on economic and 
demographic progress. 
13. Conclusion 
Our generation has had the privilege of living in a very special period in the history 
of mankind. Never in history have material conditions progressed at the rate to which we 
have become used to in the post-war years, never have the different parts of the globe and 
the different populations become so close, and world population increased at a faster rate. 
Never have overall vital statistics improved in such a substantial way. Still, an important 
part of humanity lives precarious lives under appalling conditions of absolute poverty, but 
its relative share, and in more recent times even its absolute numbers, have steadily 
decreased. In the continuation, and possibly the intensification, of this process may lie the 
hope of eventually overcoming world poverty (at least in absolute terms). At the basis of 
                                                 
178 A clear-cut example of the extreme dangers of a perceived process of alteration of the overall strategic 
balance between nuclear powers is provided to the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world very close 
to a global nuclear catastrophe. 
179 China’s status as a dominant power seems inevitable if the actual pace of its economic and military growth 
is maintained. Its nationalistic-revisionist bias, as revealed by the obsession of annexing Taiwan (since the 
takeover by the Communists of continental China a de facto independent country that belonged to the 
Chinese empire until 1895, and then a Japanese colony until 1945) by force if necessary, and the scramble 
for the contested partition of the oil resources of the China sea, could make its dominance a danger for 
world peace. According to past experience any time new international actors raise forcefully to the scene of 
international politics following successful economic growth, some violent adjustments of the power 
relations are on the agenda (cf. Easterlin, 1996, p. 6). But, optimistically, one could also envisage an 
alternative path, leading China to become part of a “world security community, a group among whom war 
is literally unthinkable” (Jervis, 2002, p. 1).  The signals that China directs to the outside world are mixed. 
On the one hand there is the diplomatic approach of “China’s peaceful rise” aiming to create good 
neighbouring relations with the other South-East Asian countries, aiming to the creation of a 
comprehensive Free Trade Area, on the other there is the disquieting growth of its military might, whereby 
military expenditures grow at double digit since the nineties. (See Jamestown Foundation, 2009.) 
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those achievements there has been a system of production and of organization (whatever 
its specific variations in the different countries and the different times) that has put to the 
fore the systematic pursuit of technical progress, and its utilization in all aspects of 
economic life, while providing the drive and the incentives to do so. A contributing factor 
accompanying the greatest increase of population and living standards that the world has 
historically known has been the intensification and acceleration of world economic and 
non-economic exchanges (“globalization”). In a world characterized by “capitalist peace” 
and by the refusal of the autarchic tendencies of a recent past, when autarchy was preparing 
the ground to a disastrous world war, any country takes advantage of the others through 
mutually beneficial voluntary exchanges rather than through conquest and exploitation. No 
alternative better foundation of international economic relations has to date been credibly 
proposed. But this same system has also brought about the utilization of technical progress 
for making increasingly more destructive the technology of warfare. For the first time in 
history mankind has produced the military technology that has the potential to lead to its 
own demise. The danger of global thermonuclear warfare has kept the world by and large 
at relative peace for more than sixty years, quite an unprecedented achievement, which has 
presumably very much contributed to the overall positive results. But even if the danger 
appears to have decreased with the end of the Cold War, the potential for large scale 
destruction remains, and may increase with the spreading of nuclear technology in presence 
of persisting or even increasing nationalistic drives, such as by resurging old imperial 
powers. The increasing perceptions, favoured by globalization, of the inequalities and 
injustices of the world economic order, together with the disruption of ancient life styles 
and privileges, and the recurring scourge of nationalism may put in jeopardy the future 
economic progress, conditioned by the persistence of “the capitalist peace”. Traditional 
power politics and dangerous brinkmanship may resurface again. Sooner or later we may 
go back to normality, with nationalism breeding imperialism and wars of aggression, but 
with much enhanced capabilities for destruction. Large scale nuclear warfare is always a 
possibility, especially with the inevitable proliferation of nuclear capabilities, with enormous 
risks for the survival of humanity, even short of Dr. Strangelove’s Doomsday Machine. As 
always has been the case in history, prosperity and economic progress are by no means 
foregone conclusions.  
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